2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jnca.2015.09.004
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A survey of incentive mechanisms in static and mobile P2P systems

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Cited by 24 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
(34 reference statements)
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“…The performance of a decentralized P2P system relies on the voluntary participation of its users. To achieve a good performance it is necessary to implement methods that provide incentives to stimulate cooperation among users [58]. A simple incentive mechanism is based on ranking highly the results of a particular node if it has contributed significantly in previous searches.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The performance of a decentralized P2P system relies on the voluntary participation of its users. To achieve a good performance it is necessary to implement methods that provide incentives to stimulate cooperation among users [58]. A simple incentive mechanism is based on ranking highly the results of a particular node if it has contributed significantly in previous searches.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it is not advantageous to implement a peerto-peer system without data replication. In a centralized system, the replication may be used or not and it depends on the application requirements: it aims to protect the data and to ensure a better scalability [11] system, the response time to a request is less than one second [24] and the system adapts systematically to the loading time if there is a large volume of requests [25]. This advantage is due to the powerful TTP that supports several management mechanisms.…”
Section: Comparative Study Between the Blockchain And Classical Sysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Normally, the security of two-party protocols is discussed with a single external attacker, who is assumed to arbitrarily sabotage the protocols by corrupting at most one party. In most cases, however, a realistic attacker often sabotages the security protocols with certain incentives instead of arbitrary purposes (Haddi and Benchaïba 2015;Zhao et al 2012;Wu et al 2014). If the attacker can justify his (or her) attacks, he (or she) will be motivated to launch the corruption such that the protocols are changed toward the way to benefit him (or her).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%