Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars

Abstract

Why do rebels kill each other? When confronting a formidable regime, rebels often descend into warring factionalism rather than forge unity across their ranks to reap the advantages of cooperation. This article tackles the puzzle of inter-rebel fratricide. It explores power and resource competition arguments, and contrasts them with ideological mechanisms that can drive inter-rebel violence. It argues that ideological extremity is central to rebel fratricide. Rebel organizations with common ideological origins can still compete with each other based on their degree of centrism and extremism, making them ideologically distant. This proximity-distance paradox makes their cohabitation mutually threatening. Ideological challengers from the same family tree are particularly threatening to one's group cohesion, and if successful, guarantee one's political marginalization within the broader movement. Extremist groups are likely to respond to these threats with fratricide, while ideologically centrist ones will rely on other strategies such as balancing, outbidding, or defecting to manage their rivalries. Algeria's civil war, 1992-2002, is a plausibility probe case study that illustrates these causal mechanisms. The study contributes to a burgeoning literature on the role of ideology in armed civil conflicts.

On-Side fighting in civil war: The logic of mortal alignment in Syria

“… 9. This is consistent with the finding in Gade et al (2019) and Hafez (2020), namely that ideological differences between Syrian rebel groups may drive fighting among them. …”

“…Third, in which ways do ideological differences among on-side groups interact with the level of enemy threat? Gade et al (2019) and Hafez (2020) explore how such differences affect armed group behavior in Syria. Might certain ideological differences or distances be insignificant enough such that they will not lead to on-side fighting even in the absence of enemy threat?…”

Rebel Rivalry and the Strategic Nature of Rebel Group Ideology and Demands

“…This is not ideal for rebel groups, as they will be forced to compete with other groups for access to information, financial resources, and recruitment opportunities provided by like-minded constituencies. Constituents can easily switch loyalties among ideologically similar groups based on which group is more competent in securing demands (Staniland 2012; Hafez 2020). By adopting distinct ideological positions, groups will polarize the ideological market of the civil war, which will in turn secure lack of substitutability and maximize their possible pool of supporters.…”

Fragmentation and Cooperation in the Jihadi International (Sub)System: ‘Islamic State’ vs. Al-Qaeda and Beyond

“…Of the two, intra-group competition and factionalism is easier to pinpoint. Internal fragmentation or 'fratricide' (Hafez 2017;Staniland 2012) occurs when groups that belong to the same movement 'start targeting each other through words and/or actions' (Hamming 2020, p. 14). Competition between groups has been linked to higher lethality, as the effort to 'outbid' rival groups leads to more violence (Bakke et al 2012;Conrad and Greene 2015) and suicide terrorism (Bloom 2005), especially in religious and nationalist movements (Nemeth 2014).…”