How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological and demand positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ strategic use of ideology and demands has received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically and demand-wise from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands as the number of rival groups increases.
How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups' ideological positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups' strategic use of ideology has so far received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique ideological products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands from the government as the number of rival groups increases.
What increases warring parties’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement? In this study, I answer this question by examining the political environment a government and rebel group leadership internally encounter during a peace process. I disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and rebels into their respective political elements that either grant autonomy or create constraints for resolution, namely, their constituencies and elites. I argue that willingness to end fighting does not always translate into the ability to make concessions. Although battlefield-related indicators may increase the likelihood of negotiations, it is internal cohesion that increases combatants’ credibility as bargaining partners and improves the likelihood of settlement. To test these arguments, I introduce original data on negotiations for internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005. Findings using two-stage censored probit models demonstrate that war-weariness increases willingness for negotiations whereas internal consensus creates opportunity for settlement.
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