Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

Goetz, Stewart

doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00107.x

Cited by 23 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…PAP simply claims that you will never fi nd a case in which someone is morally responsible for an action or choice, although she lacked alternatives to that action or choice. This is consistent with something besides the lack of alternatives, though cor-3 Versions of this objection are found in Widerker (1995aWiderker ( , 1995b; Kane (1985Kane ( , 1996; Ginet (1996); and Goetz (2005). For a good discussion of the state of this debate, see Haji and McKenna (2004).…”

mentioning

confidence: 61%

“…And let us also grant that determinism, in some manner or other, must be assumed in order for alternative possibilities to be eliminated. 7 Though Goetz (2005) claims otherwise: 'The proponent of PAP thinks that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise does not by itself explain the absence of moral responsibility. This is because he believes that when this lack obtains, its obtaining is itself explained by, and can only be explained by, the occurrence of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

Funkhouser

2009

Can. J. of Philosophy

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For nearly forty years now, Frankfurt cases have served as one of the major contributors to the compatibilist's cause with respect to moral responsibility. These cases typically involve a causally preempted condition that is supposed to guarantee a choice without causing it. This has had the effect of softening up some to the idea that determinism does not exclude moral responsibility simply in virtue of guaranteeing a unique future. I believe that these traditional Frankfurt cases adequately support this cause. But I also believe that the traditional versions of Frankfurt cases suffer from some rhetorical defects.My strategy is as follows. First, I want to respond to a dilemma that has been raised by some libertarians against arguments utilizing Frankfurt cases. This dilemma has the effect of raising a question-begging charge against such arguments. Part of my response is to draw attention to the relevant principle that I think Frankfurt cases should really target, a principle slightly different from Harry Frankfurt's original Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Second, I elaborate and defend the claim that traditional Frankfurt cases involve causal preemption.

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confidence: 61%

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confidence: 99%

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

Funkhouser

2009

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…Stewart Goetz contends that in general, the absence of the relevant alternative possibility in a Frankfurt case can only be explained by the agent's being causally determined by factors beyond his control in the actual sequence, and that this is so in Tax Evasion as well (2005, 2009: 101–106). After all, that Joe decides to evade taxes is entailed by the elements of the set‐up of the example, which are beyond Joe's control.…”

Section: Evading the Dilemma Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION¹

Pereboom¹

2012

Philosophical Issues

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“…This, however, leaves us either with semi-compatibilism about moral responsibility and not compatibilism about free will (Fischer and Ravizza 1998), or it results in revisionist accounts which simply deny that free will requires the ability to do otherwise (Frankfurt 1971;Dennett 1984;Vargas 2007). More importantly, the argument from Frankfurt-style examples has been rather controversial (Ekstrom 2002;Widerker 2003;Goetz 2005;Vihvelin 2013: Ch. 4).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended

Schlosser¹

2017

Journal of Philosophical Research

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Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the mere possession of a general ability to do otherwise is not sufficient for having the ability that is required for free will. This concession distinguishes the view from the traditional conditional analysis and from recent dispositional accounts of the ability to do otherwise, and we will see that this concession enables a straightforward response to the counterexamples. This, in turn, will play a crucial role in my response to the strongest version of the consequence argument for incompatibilism.

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Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

Cited by 23 publications

References 13 publications

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION¹

Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended

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Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

Cited by 23 publications

References 13 publications

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION1

Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended

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FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION¹