Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended

Abstract

Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the mere possession of a general ability to do otherwise is not sufficient for having the ability that is required for free will. This concession distinguishes the view from the traditional conditional analysis and from recent dispositional accounts of the ability to do otherwise, and we will see that this concession enables a straightforward response to the counterexamples. This, in turn, will play a crucial role in my response to the strongest version of the consequence argument for incompatibilism.

Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths

“…Admittedly, there's still work to be done in other venues to flesh out how this leeway requirement is to be made intelligible in a more fine‐grained manner. In the present work, I won't endorse any particular conceptions, between the classical view (Hume, 2018, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Ayer, 1954), new dispositionalist views (Fara, 2008; Smith, 2003; Vihvelin, 2004, 2013), and others (Campbell, 2011; Schlosser, 2017).…”

“…Admittedly, there's still work to be done in other venues to flesh out how this leeway requirement is to be made intelligible in a more fine-grained manner. In the present work, I won't endorse any particular conceptions, between the classical view (Hume, 2018, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Ayer, 1954, new dispositionalist views (Fara, 2008;Smith, 2003;Vihvelin, 2004Vihvelin, , 2013, and others (Campbell, 2011;Schlosser, 2017). Before closing, though, I'd like to offer a good reason for thinking that whatever an intelligible compatibilist-friendly leeway condition is, the competitor, indeterminism-requiring leeway, is not conceptually intelligible.…”