Formal Security Verification of Third Party Intellectual Property Cores for Information Leakage

Rajendran, Jeyavijayan; Dhandayuthapany, Arunshankar Muruga; Vedula, V.M.; Karri, Ramesh

doi:10.1109/vlsid.2016.143

Cited by 46 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Design stage Trojan detection methods are utilized to support IC developers and designers for validation of IP cores and the final designs. Present design stage detection techniques can be classified into formal verification (Jin et al 2013;Guo et al 2015;Rajendran et al 2015;Rajendran et al 2016), code coverage analysis (Hicks et al 2010;Sturton et al 2011), logic testing, functional analysis (Waksman et al 2013), and structural analysis Tehranipoor et al 2013).…”

Section: Countermeasures Against Ic Trojan Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Integrated Circuit Trojans

2021

CEIS

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Section: Countermeasures Against Ic Trojan Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Integrated Circuit Trojans

2021

CEIS

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“…However, the complexity of such an analysis method is extremely high, which increases with the circuit size exponentially [78]. In formal verification methods, IPs are verified by proof‐checking tools to avoid including unintended functionalities [79–82]. Design‐for‐trust techniques have also been proposed.…”

Section: Pip Vendor Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ten years of hardware Trojans: a survey from the attacker's perspective

Xue

Liu

et al. 2020

IET Computers & Digital Techniques

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In the last decade, hardware Trojan has emerged as a serious concern in integrated circuit (IC) industry. As such, hardware Trojan detection techniques have been studied extensively. However, in order to develop reliable and effective defenses, it is important to figure out how hardware Trojans are implemented in practical scenarios. In this paper, we attempt to make a review of the hardware Trojan design and implementations in the last decade and also provide an outlook. Unlike all previous surveys that discuss Trojans from the defender's perspective, for the first time, we study the Trojans from the attacker's perspective, focusing on the attacker's methods, capabilities and challenges when he designs and implements a hardware Trojan. Particularly, the following questions are explored. What are the current methods and capabilities of attackers after ten years of research and development? By considering more and more sophisticated hardware Trojan detection techniques, what challenges do the attackers face, and vice versa? First, we present adversarial models in terms of the adversary's methods, adversary's capabilities and adversary's challenges in seven practical hardware Trojan implementation scenarios: in-house design team attacks, third-party intellectual property (3PIP) vendor attacks, computer-aided design (CAD) tools attacks, fabrication stage attacks, testing stage attacks, distribution stage attacks, and field programmable gate array (FPGA) Trojan attacks. Second, we analyze the hardware Trojan implementation methods under each adversarial model in terms of seven aspects/metrics: hardware Trojan attack scenarios, the attacker's motivation, feasibility (the practicality of the attacks), detectability (anti-detection capability of that kind of Trojan), protection and prevention suggestions for the designer, overhead analysis, and case studies of Trojan implementations. Finally, future directions on hardware Trojan attacks and defenses are discussed. This paper also presents several new insights and assumptions for the first time, including considering the Trojans not only from the copyright owner's perspective, but also from the users' perspective, and discussing the hardware Trojan attacks in the testing phase and in the distribution phase. This paper can hopefully provide a reference for future works on building effective hardware Trojan defenses.

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“…Although formal methods in (b) have proven effective to detect HTs violating the security properties (Rathmair and Schupfer 2014), especially in detecting information leakage (Rajendran et al 2016) and malicious modifications of data (Rajendran et al 2015). The security properties are time-consuming and error-prone to write, which is a challenging task for the SoC designers.…”

Section: Hardware Trojans Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%