Foreign Interests Lobbying Brussels: Participation of non‐EU Members in Commission Consultations*

Abstract

Using data on contributions to European Commission online consultations from 2001 to 2010, this article examines the level and character of engagement of foreign states in preparation of EU policy. The results show that regional differences in the overall participation of foreign actors are cancelled out when controlling for different demand‐ and supply‐side factors of regional representation. A country's volume of EU trade, level of development and degree of democracy all contribute to increasing participation. Moreover, variation in national economic and political structures helps explain the types of actors by which a country is represented.

Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act

“…The method of comparing policy drafts before and after interest group lobbying has been advocated as an ideal way to detect groups' influence (Lowery ). While numerous studies of governments' open consultations with the public have been conducted in the European Union (e.g., Klüver ; Quittkat ; Rasmussen and Alexandrova ; Rasmussen and Carroll ) as well as in US federal agencies (Golden ; Yackee and Yackee ), written comments to congressional committees have never before been analyzed in political science publications (but see Burstein's analysis of witness testimony in congressional committees). Yet doing so is likely to yield significantly different conclusions about the ability of lobbyists to secure their policy preferences: “It's too hard to try to locate the precise policy concessions that each interest group is looking for; these can be quite specific and won't necessarily show up in aggregate measures of policy” (Fouirnaies and Hall ).…”

The responsiveness of legislative actors to stakeholders’ demands in the European Union

“…The Commission is surprisingly more responsive to non-EU stakeholders than to EU or member state-based stakeholders. In one of the few studies to examine the participation of non-EU stakeholders in EU consultations, Rasmussen and Alexandrova (2012) find that participation is affected by level of trade between the EU and the country of origin of non-EU stakeholders. From the perspective of resource exchange theory, the Commission's role as the EU's external trade representative is relevant, because this gives the Commission a particular need for information on the consequences of policies for the EU's external trading relations.…”

“…It is perhaps surprising that non-EU stakeholders also participate in consultations and attempt to influence the EU legislative process. In a previous large-n study of a broad range of consultations held between 2001 and 2010, Rasmussen and Alexandrova (2012) found substantial levels of participation from non-EU stakeholders, particularly from countries with high levels of trade with the EU. Since none of the legislative actors has an obvious mandate to represent the interests of non-EU stakeholders we expect that: H3: All legislative actors are more responsive to the policy demands of EU-wide and national stakeholders than to demands expressed by non-EU stakeholders.…”

La culture et son impact sur les actions politiques des entreprises

“…Les lobbyistes bruxellois étant réticents à participer aux études académiques (Barron et Hulten, 2014), cette recherche est basée sur des données secondaires. Suivant l'approche de Rasmussen et Alexandrova (2013), le portail Your Voice in Europe a servi de source pour les contributions reçues par la Commission en réponse à ses consultations sur le RGPD. Ces données ont été complétées par LobbyPlag, un portail dédié au RGPD qui documente les requêtes émises par des lobbyistes auprès des décideurs lors du processus législatif.…”