The responsiveness of legislative actors to stakeholders’ demands in the European Union

Judge, Andrew; Thomson, Robert

doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1489878

Cited by 15 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 33 publications

(32 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…By contrast, national preference formation on EU crisis decision-making has received less attention from a responsiveness perspective (cf. Judge and Thomson, 2019: 691). This shortcoming is surprising, because national preference formation is a key step of EU decision-making, and it is also considered important from a legitimacy standpoint, as for instance, put forward in Bellamy’s (2019) republican intergovernmentalism.…”

Section: Crises and Governmental Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…National preference formation so far has not received a lot of attention from a responsiveness perspective (cf. Judge and Thomson, 2019: 691). This is somewhat surprising, given the importance attributed to this step both in integration theory and in the normative literature, as for instance, highlighted by Bellamy’s (2019: 10) ‘republican intergovernmentalism’.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Crises and Responsiveness: Analysing German Preference Formation During the Eurozone Crisis

Degner

Leuffen

2019

Political Studies Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Do crises increase governmental responsiveness to citizens’ policy demands in the European Union? Building on the responsiveness literature, we challenge the claim that well-organized business interests determine governmental preferences in times of crisis. We argue instead, that vote-seeking governments rather account for citizens’ policy demands, given particularly high levels of saliency and public attention prevalent during crises. To test our theory, we analyse the formation of German governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union reforms during the Eurozone Crisis. We use novel data from the ‘EMUChoices’ project, public opinion polls as well as newspaper articles and trace the development of the German government’s positioning on reforms such as the new Eurozone bailout fund or the tightening of fiscal governance rules. Our analyses show that the German government, despite intensive lobbying efforts by banks and industry associations, responded rather closely to the demands of the public. On a normative ground, this finding highlights that input legitimacy in European Union decision-making is stronger than oftentimes assumed, at least at the level of governmental preference formation in times of crises.

show abstract

Section: Crises and Governmental Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crises and Responsiveness: Analysing German Preference Formation During the Eurozone Crisis

Degner

Leuffen

2019

Political Studies Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Beyers and Kerremans 2004;Coen and Richardson eds. 2009;Klüwer 2011;Bunea 2013;Bunea and Thomson 2015;Judge and Thomson 2019). Existing research focuses mainly on the inputs into these consultations, including the balance of interests that participate.…”

Section: Policy Preferences and Stakeholders In Explanations Of Non-compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Existing research focuses mainly on the inputs into these consultations, including the balance of interests that participate. For instance, Bunea's (2013) and Judge and Thomson's (2019) research examines how interest groups' policy demands affect the contents of legislative proposals and member states' negotiating positions. Rasmussen and Toshkov (2013) find that legislative proposals preceded by consultations took longer to adopt than proposals that were not preceded by consultations.…”

Section: Policy Preferences and Stakeholders In Explanations Of Non-compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Incentives to conform and exceed (2 and 3) may be subsumed under a general heading of incentives to comply, since their consequences for compliance are likely to be similar. Furthermore, the preferences of national governments and stakeholders are linked, because national governments are most responsive to the policy demands of stakeholders from their own national territories (Judge and Thomson 2019).…”

Section: Policy Preferences and Stakeholders In Explanations Of Non-compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Incentives to comply: the impact of national governments’ and stakeholders’ preferences on compliance with EU laws

Thomson

Torenvlied

Judge

2019

Journal of European Public Policy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Established explanations of differences in compliance outcomes highlight the policy preferences of implementers. The application of these theories to compliance with EU laws focuses on national governments and stakeholders. This study improves on existing conceptualisations of governments' and stakeholders' preferences by distinguishing between their incentives to deviate from, conform to and exceed the standards contained in EU laws. We apply these concepts to detailed evidence on national governments' and stakeholders' policy preferences and national governments' transposition records. The study finds that incentives to conform and exceed are generally more frequent than incentives to deviate. Moreover, the policy preferences of national governments and stakeholders are linked, as governments' preferences often agree with national stakeholders' demands. Both national governments' and stakeholders' incentives to comply positively affect the timeliness of transposition.

show abstract

Stakeholder Consultations

Bunea¹

2019

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The responsiveness of legislative actors to stakeholders’ demands in the European Union

Cited by 15 publications

References 33 publications

Crises and Responsiveness: Analysing German Preference Formation During the Eurozone Crisis

Crises and Responsiveness: Analysing German Preference Formation During the Eurozone Crisis

Incentives to comply: the impact of national governments’ and stakeholders’ preferences on compliance with EU laws

Stakeholder Consultations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About