In mature democracies, elections discipline leaders to deliver good economic performance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, most developing countries also hold elections, but these are often marred by illicit tactics. Using a new global data set, this article investigates whether these illicit tactics are merely blemishes or substantially undermine the economic efficacy of elections. We show that illicit tactics are widespread, and that they reduce the incentive for governments to deliver good economic performance. Our analysis also suggests that in societies with regular free and fair elections, leaders do not matter for economic growth.
II. The prevalence and pay-off to electoral misconductElections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. Most autocracies hold sham elections: to be meaningful, an election has to be conducted to certain standards. Although the quality of elections is assessed by a large number of organizations, for example, by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The Carter