Do Elections Matter for Economic Performance?

Abstract

In mature democracies, elections discipline leaders to deliver good economic performance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, most developing countries also hold elections, but these are often marred by illicit tactics. Using a new global data set, this article investigates whether these illicit tactics are merely blemishes or substantially undermine the economic efficacy of elections. We show that illicit tactics are widespread, and that they reduce the incentive for governments to deliver good economic performance. Our analysis also suggests that in societies with regular free and fair elections, leaders do not matter for economic growth. II. The prevalence and pay-off to electoral misconductElections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. Most autocracies hold sham elections: to be meaningful, an election has to be conducted to certain standards. Although the quality of elections is assessed by a large number of organizations, for example, by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The Carter

Institutions and Firms' Productivity: Evidence from Electricity Distribution in the EU

“…Property rights are a core aspect of this environment, but political institutions are increasingly being considered, in the literature, as another key determinant (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2013). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), in a seminal paper, go back to institutions in colonial times to study their long-term impact on GDP per capita.…”

Fighting for Votes: Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence

“…) and gangs (Dercon and Gutiérrez‐Romero ). Electoral malpractices not only affect election results (Getmansky and Zeitzoff ; Gould and Klor ), but also undermine governance (Collier and Hoeffler ; Chauvet and Collier ) and have dramatic consequences on civilian populations (Dupas and Robinson ; Steele ). Robinson and Torvik () show that swing voters, rather than ideological voters, can be targeted by electoral violence if voting preferences are highly dispersed.…”

“…Election violence—but also the fear of violence—can affect voter turnout and election results as well as parties’ political agendas (Getmansky and Zeitzoff ; Gould and Klor ; Ellman and Wantchekon ). When poorly conducted, elections fail to discipline leaders, thereby undermining governance and economic policies (Collier and Hoeffler ; Chauvet and Collier ). Besides direct casualties, election violence can have dramatic consequences on civilian populations, reducing income, expenditures and consumption (Dupas and Robinson ), and triggering mass movements of civilians fleeing violence (Steele ).…”

Electoral Competitiveness, Tax Bargaining and Political Incentives in Developing Countries: Evidence from Political Budget Cycles Affecting Taxation

“…96 Chauvet and Collier 2009. 97 Collier and Hoeffler 2015. broader, more long-term, outcomes. 98 It is entirely possible -and perhaps likely -that elections that place greater pressure on political leaders may generate short-term policy distortions, but larger longer-term gains in accountability.…”

“…21 Chauvet and Collier 2009. 22 Collier and Hoeffler 2015. necessitate corresponding decreases in public spending if there is a limit to the government's capacity to run fiscal deficits. Following this logic, there is evidence from existing case study research that in some cases governments may have in fact preferred to increase tax collection prior to elections in an effort to accumulate greater resources to use to secure political power.…”