The Theory of Conditional Retrospective Voting: Does the Presidential Record Matter Less in Open-Seat Elections?

Abstract

This research tests the idea that retrospective voting in presidential elections is conditional, that retrospective evaluations are applied more strictly to incumbents seeking election than to in-party candidates (successor candidates) who are not incumbents. Voters may assign only partial credit or blame for national conditions to successor candidates because, unlike incumbents, these candidates did not personally have power over the policies that might have affected the national conditions leading up to the election. This theory of conditional retrospective voting is examined at both the aggregate level on elections since 1948 and with individual-level survey data since 1972. The analysis consistently finds, as the theory of conditional retrospective voting contends, that the electorate's retrospective evaluations matter significantly more to the vote for an incumbent than to the vote for a successor candidate of the in-party.

Introduction

“…Although anemic growth works against the Democrats, the impact should be somewhat muted by the fact that the incumbent is not in this year's race (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001 ;Campbell, Dettrey and Yin 2010 ;Holbrook 2008 ). Outlook for 2016: Tilt to Republicans.…”

Context and Strategy in Presidential Campaigns: Incumbency and the Political Climate

“…What may be most important about incumbency as a context of a campaign is that a campaign without the incumbent running is less about the incumbent and the incumbent's record (Miller and Wattenberg, 1985;Campbell, 2001a;Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001;Norpoth, 2002;Holbrook, 60 2008; Campbell, Dettrey, and Yin, 2009). In Lippman's terms, elections without the incumbent in the race are somewhat less about supporting the Ins or the Outs.…”

Las dinámicas del voto retrospectivo en España (1996-2017)

“…Por ello se A. Alaminos y P. Alaminos-Fernández considera que frecuentemente deciden sus votos no tanto en función de la ideología de los partidos o los programas que proponen, sino de la actuación de estos en el tiempo. Son varios los estudios empíricos (Campbell et al, 2010) que se concentran en determinar cómo para los electorados de centro lo importante en su decisión de voto es la actuación de los partidos y de los líderes políticos (su reflejo en la situación social y econó-mica). Las promesas electorales o programas futuros tendrían desde esta teoría un peso mínimo sobre las decisiones de los votantes de centro.…”

“…Entre estos elementos de variabilidad se encuentra, por ejemplo, si el candidato se presenta a reelección o no. Según varios autores (Campbell, 2010) el efecto electoral de una valoración positiva de la gestión se debilita cuando el jefe de Gobierno no se presenta como candidato a reelección. En otras palabras, el cambio de candidato produce que el partido no capitalice por completo los beneficios de una buena situación socioeconómi-ca.…”