Flow Fragmentalism

Torrengo, Giuliano; Iaquinto, Samuele

doi:10.1111/theo.12182

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Following Fine's introduction of fragmentalism, a number of others have developed forms of the view, including Martin Lipman (2015, 2016, 2018, 2023), Roberto Loss (2017), Giuliano Torrengo and Samuele Iaquinto (2019, 2022), Iaquinto (2019, 2020), and Giovanni Merlo (2023). In addition to the varying technical frameworks these authors have introduced for thinking about a fragmented reality, there are two central conceptual issues which they have varying takes on.…”

Section: Forms Of Fragmentalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to be a perspectival pluralist

Solomyak

2024

Philosophy Compass

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The temporal, first‐personal, and modal domains in metaphysics involve a range of perspectives on reality: the perspective of the present as opposed to those of other times, the perspective of one's own self as opposed to those of other subjects, and the perspective of the actual world as opposed to those of other possible worlds. In each case, we can ask about the metaphysical standing of these various perspectives with respect to one another: Is one perspective privileged above the rest? There is a tension at the heart of our intuitive conception of the phenomena in these domains, motivating (at least in some of these cases) a pluralist conception of reality — a stance which attempts to take seriously the absoluteness of the present‐tensed, first‐personal, or actual‐worldly facts, while also embracing the equal standing in reality of all perspectives of the relevant kind. My purpose in this paper is, first, to present an overview of recently popular forms of pluralism — or, what Fine (2005) calls non‐standard realism — with a particular focus on fragmentalism. I'll then raise a worry for fragmentalist views, and finally, present an alternative form of pluralism about the perspectival. We'll see that, while in some ways more radical, the alternative form of pluralism I present has some conceptual advantages over more familiar non‐standard realist views, and — more generally — can help illuminate the space of possible pluralist views about the perspectival.

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Section: Forms Of Fragmentalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…34 34 As we've seen, some proponents of fragmentalism — such as Torrengo and Iaquinto (2019, 2022), as well as Lipman (2023) — would also accept something along the lines of this pluralist conclusion. The options I've laid out here are thus not necessarily mutually exclusive.…”

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How to be a perspectival pluralist

Solomyak

2024

Philosophy Compass

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“…Indeed, he may endorse a full ontology of things past, present, and future' (2005: p. 299). Some, e.g., Torrengo & Iaquinto (2019), have suggested that factive presentism is not presentism, unless conjoined with ontic presentism; then it is presentism as it is 'ordinarily understood' (2019: p. 185). For a discussion of 'fragmentalist' presentism, inspired by Fine, see Iaquinto (2019).…”

Section: Presentism With Non-present Objectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The rotten core of presentism

Tallant

Ingram

2020

Synthese

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Recently, some have attempted to reformulate debates in first-order metaphysics, particularly in the metaphysics of time and modality, for reasons due to Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013). In this paper, we focus on the ways in which the likes of Cameron, Correia and Rosenkranz, Deasy, Ingram, Tallant, Viebahn, inter alia, have initiated and responded to attempts to capture the core of presentism using a formal, logical machinery. We argue that such attempts are doomed to fail because there is no theoretical core to presentism. There is no single view or family of views that is presentism.

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“…5 5 We are here elaborating and expanding on the theory set forth in Torrengo and Iaquinto (2019) and Iaquinto (2019). …”

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“…22 22 For a more detailed elaboration of how Flow Fragmentalism captures the passage of time see Torrengo and Iaquinto (2019). …”

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confidence: 99%

The Invisible Thin Red Line

Torrengo

Iaquinto

2020

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The aim of this paper is to argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, we elaborate what we call Flow Fragmentalism, a view inspired by Kit Fine's non‐standard tense realism, according to which reality is divided up into maximally coherent collections of tensed facts. In this way, we show how to reconcile a genuinely A‐theoretic branching time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world.

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Flow Fragmentalism

Cited by 13 publications

References 32 publications

How to be a perspectival pluralist

How to be a perspectival pluralist

The rotten core of presentism

The Invisible Thin Red Line

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