Flourishing as the aim of education: towards an extended, ‘enchanted’ Aristotelian account

Abstract

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Emotions targeting moral exemplarity: Making sense of the logical geography of admiration, emulation and elevation

“…There is thus no aweeither inspired by a heightened sense of beauty in art/nature, the immensity of the universe or the goodness of an ideal of self-sacrifice. This is, by no means, a novel observation (see further in Kristjánsson, 2016b).…”

At the Heart of Virtue Growth: ‘Self-of-virtue’ and ‘Virtue identity’

“…For Annas, "virtues are dispositions worthy of a distinct kind of admiration, which inspire us to aspire to them as ideals" (Annas, 2011, p. 6). This is the 'enchanted version' of Aristotelian fl ourishing (Kristjánsson, 2016). The image of a self-of-virtue has also concrete cognitive contents (JCCV, 2017, p. 7): knowing how virtue develops, and the belief that virtue growth is possible (having a 'virtue growth mindset', in reference to Dweck's (2000) 'growth mindset').…”

Awe: An Aristotelian Analysis of a non-Aristotelian Virtuous Emotion

“…What lesson can we draw from this about awe? The main lesson is -radically put -that Aristotle seems to have missed something fundamental about the human ergon (see further in Kristjánsson 2016). Latter-day theorists have identified those missing parts in human beings' deep-seated orientation or urge -sometimes referred to as 'a transcendent urge'towards extraordinary, idealised experiences of the true, good and beautiful (see e.g.…”