Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We Learn from Monetary Policy?

Calmfors, Lars

doi:10.1093/cesifo/49.3.319

Cited by 71 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 28 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…This interpretation is interesting because it brings forth the relationship between stabilization policy and the welfare state. 18 Market failures in the provision of insurance are particularly important in a discussion of the welfare state, since many public sector activities can be interpreted as social insurance, that is, the public sector offers services and transfers if various contingencies are realized through life. Hence, the arrangements which in an ex post sense may be interpreted as serving a redistributive role will often in an ex ante sense have an insurance function.…”

Section: Fiscal Rules -Automatic Stabilizersmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?

Andersen

2005

CESifo Economic Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper discusses the need and scope for an active fiscal stabilization policy. It is argued that the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a short run stabilizer does not depend on the long run multipliers of (balanced budget) fiscal policies. To the extent that activity can be affected by aggregate demand in the short run, there is a case for a fiscal stabilization policy in terms of temporary variations in taxes or public consumption contingent on the state of the economy. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is supported by empirical evidence. However, an appropriate policy intervention depends both on the nature of the shock and the structure of the economy. There are thus fundamental information problems in pursuing discretionary fiscal policies on top of political economy concerns, and fiscal fine-tuning is not to be recommended. Automatic stabilizers do not to the same extent suffer from these problems, but their strength is not by design but the net result of other policy considerations. Hence, there is a need to consider the structure and size of automatic stabilizers. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Code: E6.

show abstract

Section: Fiscal Rules -Automatic Stabilizersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Seidman (2001) for an account of the origin of this idea and Calmfors (2003) for an overview of the recent debate). This idea is inspired by the debate on and the subsequent establishment of independent central banks assigned a well defined objective.…”

Section: Fiscal Rules -Automatic Stabilizersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?

Andersen

2005

CESifo Economic Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As in monetary policy, the trade-off between value judgement and specialized knowledge plays a crucial role in delegating fiscal policy to an independent institution (Calmfors 2003). If the effects of fiscal policy affect the whole society and expertise plays a crucial role, fiscal policy can be delegated because democratic accountability is not the main objective (Blinder 1997, 121).…”

Section: Contentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

Mihailov

Ullrich

2007

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp07044.pdf Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61, E63

show abstract

“…Although there has been proposals to develop similar independent institutions for fiscal policy (Wyplosz, 2005;Calmfors, 2003), the consensus is that this is not feasible without interfering too much in the policy decision process and the autonomy of democratically elected governments. Instead the focus has been on the development of fiscal policy targets and rules with the purpose of increasing the political costs of opportunism and shortism in economic policy making.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Swedish fiscal policy framework and intermediate fiscal policy targets

Andersen

2013

Swiss J Economics Statistics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Summary Sweden is a front-runner in defining intermediate targets for fiscal policy (fiscal rules) as well as in setting up an independent fiscal council to monitor and comment on developments. Swedish public finances are among the most sound in the OECD having been able to consolidate public finances and ensure fiscal sustainability, and they have maintained room for fiscal manoeuvre also during the financial crisis. This paper takes a closer look at the Swedish case as the stepping stone for a more general discussion of how to set intermediate targets for fiscal policy and the role fiscal councils may have in strengthening political accountability and thus ultimately credibility of fiscal policy. The Swedish fiscal framework is compared to the fiscal compact for EU countries, and it is argued that it has a number of desirable features.

show abstract

Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We Learn from Monetary Policy?

Cited by 71 publications

References 28 publications

Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?

Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

The Swedish fiscal policy framework and intermediate fiscal policy targets

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About