Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia

Abstract

Abstract:In this paper, using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies, we empirically examine the determinants of the choice and size of the collective executive board, a core element of the multi-tier board system of Russian firms. Our empirical evidence strongly suggests that the need of company executives for a collective management system is a key driver for the formation of a collective executive board, while outside investors are generally indifferent toward its adoption as a means to strengthening the monitoring and control functions over top management. We also found that Russian firms in the pursuit of the internationalization of their business activities tend to avoid the establishment of a collective executive board, which is a diverse corporate organ from the viewpoint of the international standard of corporate governance systems. JEL classification numbers: D22, G34, K22, L22, P31, P34

Networks of directors on Russian boards: The hidden part of the corporate governance iceberg

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