Boards of directors in Russian publicly traded companies in 1998–2014: Structure, dynamics and performance effects

Abstract

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Female representation on boards andCEOperformance‐induced turnover: Evidence from Russia

“…Overall, women account for 11% of board members. Next, board characteristics are largely consistent with the literature (Basargin & Perevalov, 2000; Iwasaki, 2008; Muravyev, 2017; Puffer & McCarthy, 2003). On average, a Russian board consists of nine directors.…”

Corporate Governance System and Regional Heterogeneity: Evidence from East and West Russia

“…For more details of the legal forms of incorporation and statutory company organs of Russian companies, see Dolgopyatova et al (2009) and Iwasaki (2007a;2013). 8 Quite a few articles have been published in Russian as well as international comparative studies that include Russia, which we will not mention here because they have already been cited by Muravyev (2017).…”

“…(2) Expert auditors account for only 16.5% of all committee members, and the majority of companies employ no expert auditors at all. (3) Local small-and mediumsized audit firms account for 68.5% of all external auditors elected by surveyed companies, and 9 According to Muravyev et al (2014) and Muravyev (2017), the board of directors of Russian listed companies consists of 8.8 members on average, with 57% elected from outside the company and 10% independent directors. Furthermore, the polarization in board composition in terms of the proportion of outside directors observed by Iwasaki (2008) was not so marked in listed companies investigated by these authors.…”

“…Corporate Governance System and Regional Heterogeneity 2 by Muravyev (2017), 2 no empirical study has been published to date that addresses the regional heterogeneity in corporate governance systems. Filling these gaps would undoubtedly have significant implications, not only for the study of the Russian economy but also for corporate finance and organizational economics.…”

“…2 See Section 3 and Appendix A in Muravyev (2017). 3 Most respondents were either the president or executive director, accounting for 63.2% of all respondents.…”