Field trial of a quantum secured 10 Gb/s DWDM transmission system over a single installed fiber

Choi, Iris; Zhou, Yu Rong; Dynes, J. F.; Zhong, Yuan; Klar, Andreas; Sharpe, A. W.; Plews, Alan; Lucamarini, Marco; Radig, Christian; Neubert, Jörg; Grießer, Helmut; Eiselt, Michael; Chunnilall, Christopher J.; Lepert, Guillaume; Sinclair, Alastair G.; Elbers, Jörg-Peter; Lord, Andrew; Shields, A. J.

doi:10.1364/oe.22.023121

Cited by 84 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The leftmost point corresponds to a rate of 1.257 Mbit/s, a record in terms of key rate mediated by two-photon interference. The rightmost point corresponds to about 4 kbit/s over 21 dB attenuation, which is still sufficient to generate a 256-AES key more frequently than every 100 ms [26].Following the analysis in Ref.[27], we consider how the statistical fluctuations of a finite data sample can affect the secure key rate. With the empty square point in Fig.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers

Comandar¹,

Lucamarini²,

Fröhlich³

et al. 2016

Nature Photon

246

193

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Security in quantum cryptography [1, 2] is continuously challenged by inventive attacks [3][4][5][6][7] targeting the real components of a cryptographic setup, and duly restored by new countermeasures [8][9][10] to foil them. Due to their high sensitivity and complex design, detectors are the most frequently attacked components. Recently it was shown that two-photon interference [11] from independent light sources can be exploited to avoid the use of detectors at the two ends of the communication channel [12,13]. This new form of detection-safe quantum cryptography, called Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD), has been experimentally demonstrated [13][14][15][16][17][18], but with modest delivered key rates.Here we introduce a novel pulsed laser seeding technique to obtain high-visibility interference from gain-switched lasers and thereby perform quantum cryptography without detector vulnerabilities with unprecedented bit rates, in excess of 1 Mb/s. This represents a 2 to 6 orders of magnitude improvement over existing implementations and for the first time promotes the new scheme as a practical resource for quantum secure communications. * marco.lucamarini@crl.toshiba.co.uk arXiv:1509.08137v2 [quant-ph] In Quantum Cryptography, a sender Alice transmits encoded quantum signals to a receiver Bob, who measures them and distils a secret string of bits with the sender via public discussion [1].Ideally, the use of quantum signals guarantees the information-theoretical security of the communication [2]. In practice, however, Quantum Cryptography is implemented with real components, which can deviate from the ideal description. This can be exploited to circumvent the quantum protection if the users are unaware of the problem [19].Usually the most complex components are also the most vulnerable. Therefore the vast majority of the attacks performed so far have targeted Bob's single photon detectors [3][4][5][6][7]. 13] is a recent form of Quantum Cryptography conceived to remove the problem of detector vulnerability. As depicted in Fig. 1(a), two light pulses are independently encoded and sent by Alice and Bob to a central node, Charlie. This is similar to a quantum access network configuration [20], but in MDI-QKD the central node does not need to be trusted and could even attempt to steal information from Alice and Bob. To follow the MDI-QKD protocol, Charlie must let the two light pulses interfere at the beam splitter inside his station and then measure them. The result can disclose the correlation between the bits encoded by the users, but not their actual values, which therefore remain secret. If Charlie violates the protocol and measures the pulses separately, he can learn the absolute values of the bits, but not their correlation. Therefore he cannot announce the correct correlation to the users, who will then unveil his attempt through public discussion.Irrespective of Charlie's choice, the users' apparatuses no longer need a detector and the detection vulnerability of Quantum Cryp...

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers

Comandar¹,

Lucamarini²,

Fröhlich³

et al. 2016

Nature Photon

246

193

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“…An increasing number of QKD quantum networks and field trials from all over the world have been reported recently [20][4] [5] showing the feasibility of QKD architectures that are far more complex than the original point-to-point dark fiber connection. The QKD ISG aims to assist the integration process by defining relevant standards for such efforts.…”

Section: The Main Advantage Of Qkd Is That It Is Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Worldwide standardization activity for quantum key distribution

Alléaume

Degiovanni²,

Mink

et al. 2014

2014 IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps)

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Abstract-We discuss the on-going worldwide activity to develop forward looking standards for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) QKD industry specification group (ISG).The long term goal is to develop a certification methodology that bridges the gap between theoretical proofs and practical implementations with imperfect devices. Current efforts are focused on the handling of side channels and characterization of the most relevant components.

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“…Underpinned by many new developments, including the establishment of a quantified security level [2], QKD technology has matured considerably in the last decade. Furthermore the technology is making the transition from the laboratory to successful field trials [3][4][5][6][7][8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previously, operation of QKD systems usually required dedicated SSMFs, which are not only expensive but might even be unavailable. Multiplexing QKD into data-populated SSMF has been explored, but it constrains either the communication distance or the launched data laser power and maximum bandwidth [8,[18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25]. These constraints are a consequence of signal contamination to the quantum channel by the Raman photons generated by the strong data signals in the same fiber.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum key distribution over multicore fiber

Dynes¹,

Kindness²,

Tam³

et al. 2016

Opt. Express

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Abstract:We present the first quantum key distribution (QKD) experiment over multicore fiber. With space division multiplexing, we demonstrate that weak QKD signals can coexist with classical data signals launched at full power in a 53 km 7-core fiber, while showing negligible degradation in performance. Based on a characterization of intercore crosstalk, we perform additional simulations highlighting that classical data bandwidths beyond 1Tb/s can be supported with high speed QKD on the same fiber. References and links

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Field trial of a quantum secured 10 Gb/s DWDM transmission system over a single installed fiber

Cited by 84 publications

References 19 publications

Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers

Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers

Worldwide standardization activity for quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution over multicore fiber

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