Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties to share encryption keys with security based on physical laws. Experimentally, QKD has been implemented via optical means, achieving key rates of 1.26 megabits per second over 50 kilometres of standard optical fibre and of 1.16 bits per hour over 404 kilometres of ultralow-loss fibre in a measurement-device-independent configuration . Increasing the bit rate and range of QKD is a formidable, but important, challenge. A related target, which is currently considered to be unfeasible without quantum repeaters, is overcoming the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD . This limit defines the maximum possible secret key rate that two parties can distil at a given distance using QKD and is quantified by the secret-key capacity of the quantum channel that connects the parties. Here we introduce an alternative scheme for QKD whereby pairs of phase-randomized optical fields are first generated at two distant locations and then combined at a central measuring station. Fields imparted with the same random phase are 'twins' and can be used to distil a quantum key. The key rate of this twin-field QKD exhibits the same dependence on distance as does a quantum repeater, scaling with the square-root of the channel transmittance, irrespective of who (malicious or otherwise) is in control of the measuring station. However, unlike schemes that involve quantum repeaters, ours is feasible with current technology and presents manageable levels of noise even on 550 kilometres of standard optical fibre. This scheme is a promising step towards overcoming the rate-distance limit of QKD and greatly extending the range of secure quantum communications.

Abstract:A secure communication network with quantum key distribution in a metropolitan area is reported. Six different QKD systems are integrated into a mesh-type network. GHz-clocked QKD links enable us to demonstrate the world-first secure TV conferencing over a distance of 45km. The network includes a commercial QKD product for long-term stable operation, and application interface to secure mobile phones. Detection of an eavesdropper, rerouting into a secure path, and key relay via trusted nodes are demonstrated in this network. ©2011 Optical Society of AmericaOCIS codes: (270.5568) Quantum cryptography; (060.5565) Quantum communications. References and links1. N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, "Quantum cryptography," Rev. Mod. Phys. 74(1), 145-195 (2002). 2. V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dušek, N. N. Lütkenhaus, and M. Peev, "The security of practical quantum key distribution," Rev. Mod. Phys. 81(3), 1301-1350 (2009

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The theoretically proven security of quantum key distribution (QKD) could revolutionise how information exchange is protected in the future [1,2]. Several field tests of QKD have proven it to be a reliable technology for cryptographic key exchange and have demonstrated nodal networks of point-to-point links [3][4][5]. However, so far no convincing answer has been given to the question of how to extend the scope of QKD beyond niche applications in dedicated high security networks. Here we show that adopting simple and cost-effective telecommunication technologies to form a quantum access network can greatly expand the number of users in quantum networks and therefore vastly broaden their appeal. We are able to demonstrate that a high-speed single-photon detector positioned at a network node can be shared between up to 64 users for exchanging secret keys with the node, thereby significantly reducing the hardware requirements for each user added to the network. This point-to-multipoint architecture removes one of the main obstacles restricting the widespread application of QKD. It presents a viable method for realising multi-user QKD networks with resource efficiency and brings QKD closer to becoming the first widespread technology based on quantum physics.In a nodal QKD network multiple trusted repeaters are connected via point-to-point links between a quantum transmitter (Alice) and a quantum receiver (Bob). These point-to-point links can be realised with long-distance optical fibres, and in the future might even utilize ground to satellite communication [6][7][8]. While point-to-point connections are suitable to form a backbone quantum core network to bridge long distances, they are less suitable to provide the last-mile service needed to give a multitude of users access to this QKD infrastructure. Reconfigurable optical networks based on optical switches or wavelength-division multiplexing have been suggested to achieve more flexible network structures[3, 9-12], however, they also require the installation of a full QKD system per user, which is prohibitively expensive for many applications.Giving a multitude of users access to the nodal QKD network requires point-to-multipoint connections. In modern fibre-optic networks point-to-multipoint connections are often realized passively using components such as optical power splitters [13]. Single photon QKD with the sender positioned at the network node and the receiver at the user premises[14] lends itself naturally to a passive multi-user network (see Fig. 1a). However, this downstream implementation has two major shortcomings. Firstly, every user in the network requires a single photon detector, which are often expensive and difficult to operate. And secondly, it is not possible to deterministically address a user. All detectors therefore have to operate at the same speed as the transmitter in order not to miss photons, which means most of the detector bandwidth is unused.Here, we show that both problems associated with a downstream implementation can be overcome ...

Security in quantum cryptography [1, 2] is continuously challenged by inventive attacks [3][4][5][6][7] targeting the real components of a cryptographic setup, and duly restored by new countermeasures [8][9][10] to foil them. Due to their high sensitivity and complex design, detectors are the most frequently attacked components. Recently it was shown that two-photon interference [11] from independent light sources can be exploited to avoid the use of detectors at the two ends of the communication channel [12,13]. This new form of detection-safe quantum cryptography, called Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD), has been experimentally demonstrated [13][14][15][16][17][18], but with modest delivered key rates.Here we introduce a novel pulsed laser seeding technique to obtain high-visibility interference from gain-switched lasers and thereby perform quantum cryptography without detector vulnerabilities with unprecedented bit rates, in excess of 1 Mb/s. This represents a 2 to 6 orders of magnitude improvement over existing implementations and for the first time promotes the new scheme as a practical resource for quantum secure communications. * marco.lucamarini@crl.toshiba.co.uk arXiv:1509.08137v2 [quant-ph] In Quantum Cryptography, a sender Alice transmits encoded quantum signals to a receiver Bob, who measures them and distils a secret string of bits with the sender via public discussion [1].Ideally, the use of quantum signals guarantees the information-theoretical security of the communication [2]. In practice, however, Quantum Cryptography is implemented with real components, which can deviate from the ideal description. This can be exploited to circumvent the quantum protection if the users are unaware of the problem [19].Usually the most complex components are also the most vulnerable. Therefore the vast majority of the attacks performed so far have targeted Bob's single photon detectors [3][4][5][6][7]. 13] is a recent form of Quantum Cryptography conceived to remove the problem of detector vulnerability. As depicted in Fig. 1(a), two light pulses are independently encoded and sent by Alice and Bob to a central node, Charlie. This is similar to a quantum access network configuration [20], but in MDI-QKD the central node does not need to be trusted and could even attempt to steal information from Alice and Bob. To follow the MDI-QKD protocol, Charlie must let the two light pulses interfere at the beam splitter inside his station and then measure them. The result can disclose the correlation between the bits encoded by the users, but not their actual values, which therefore remain secret. If Charlie violates the protocol and measures the pulses separately, he can learn the absolute values of the bits, but not their correlation. Therefore he cannot announce the correct correlation to the users, who will then unveil his attempt through public discussion.Irrespective of Charlie's choice, the users' apparatuses no longer need a detector and the detection vulnerability of Quantum Cryp...

Quantum communications promise to revolutionise the way information is exchanged and protected. Unlike their classical counterpart, they are based on dim optical pulses that cannot be amplified by conventional optical repeaters. Consequently they are heavily impaired by propagation channel losses, which confine their transmission rate and range below a theoretical limit known as repeaterless secret key capacity. Overcoming this limit with today's technology was believed to be impossible until the recent proposal of a scheme that uses phase-coherent optical signals and an auxiliary measuring station to distribute quantum information. Here we experimentally demonstrate such a scheme for the first time and over significant channel losses, in excess of 90 dB. In the high loss regime, the resulting secure key rate exceeds the repeaterless secret key capacity, a result never achieved before. This represents a major step in promoting quantum communications as a dependable resource in today's world.

We analyse the finite-size security of the efficient Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol implemented with decoy states and apply the results to a gigahertz-clocked quantum key distribution system. Despite the enhanced security level, the obtained secure key rates are the highest reported so far at all fibre distances.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) uniquely allows distribution of cryptographic keys with security verified by quantum mechanical limits. Both protocol execution and subsequent applications require the assistance of classical data communication channels. While using separate fibers is one option, it is economically more viable if data and quantum signals are simultaneously transmitted through a single fiber. However, noise-photon contamination arising from the intense data signal has severely restricted both the QKD distances and secure key rates. Here, we exploit a novel temporal-filtering effect for noise-photon rejection. This allows high-bit-rate QKD over fibers up to 90 km in length and populated with error-free bidirectional Gb/s data communications. With high-bit rate and range sufficient for important information infrastructures, such as smart cities and 10 Gbit Ethernet, QKD is a significant step closer towards wide-scale deployment in fiber networks.