Feeling we’re biased: Autonomic arousal and reasoning conflict

Abstract

Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive beliefs. A key question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with logical considerations or from a failure to discard these tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by focusing on conflict-related autonomic nervous system modulation during biased reasoning. Participants' skin conductance responses (SCRs) were monitored while they solved classic syllogisms in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the logical correct response. Results indicated that all reasoners showed increased SCRs when solving the inconsistent conflict problems. Experiment 2 validated that this autonomic arousal boost was absent when people were not engaged in an active reasoning task. The presence of a clear autonomic conflict response during reasoning lends credence to the idea that reasoners have a "gut" feeling that signals that their intuitive response is not logically warranted. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic -journals.org/content/supplemental.

The Smart Nonconserver: Preschoolers Detect Their Number Conservation Errors

“…Classic studies on reasoning and decision-making have long established that people's inferences are often biased by prior beliefs and stereotypical intuitions (e.g., [35,36]). In line with the present findings, it has recently been shown that reasoners also detect the biased nature of their intuitive logical and probabilistic judgments (e.g., [21,25,[37][38][39][40][41][42]). Interestingly, however, developmental studies have suggested that this bias detection during logical and probabilistic reasoning is only observed after the onset of adolescence (i.e., by the end of elementary school, e.g., [43,44]).…”

Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive.

“…Again, given that conflict detection is a general phenomenon that has been established using a number of reasoning tasks (such as syllogisms. De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; the conjunction fallacy. De Neys et al, 2011;Villejoubert, 2009;ratio bias, Bonner & Newell, 2010;and the Cognitive Reflection Test;De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013), De Neys's (2012) Tl-Tl conflict stance was not intended as a specific theory of base-rate neglect, though it is consistent with the perspective of Pennycook and Thompson (2012; see also Thompson et al, 2011) and inconsistent with the "analytic base-rate" view that is prominent in the field (e.g.. Barbey & Sloman, 2007;Eerreira et al, 2006;Kahneman & Erederick, 2002).…”

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

“…As a result, participants often incorrectly endorse the conclusion as logically valid (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Nonetheless, a number of studies have demonstrated that participants are able to detect the conflict between logic and belief; a finding that applies to both syllogisms (Ball, Phillips, Wade & Quayle, 2006;De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010;Stupple & Ball, 2008;Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013) and conditionals (Handley, et al, 2011). According to the three-stage model (see also, De Neys, 2012), this conflict detection indicates that some or most participants must be intuitive logicians.…”