What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

Abstract

The distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking is common in psychology. However, while often being quite clear on the characteristics of the two processes ('Type 1' processes are fast, autonomous, intuitive, etc. and 'Type 2' processes are slow, deliberative, analytic, etc.), dual-process theorists have been heavily criticized for being unclear on the factors that determine when an individual will think analytically or rely on their intuition.

Analytic and heuristic processes in the detection and resolution of conflict

“…To disentangle between the two possibilities, we computed the response times for nonoptimal and optimal responses to conflict trials and compared them with the response time for optimal responses to no-conflict trials (e.g., De Neys, 2012;De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013;De Neys & Glumicic, 2008;Pennycook et al, 2015). In both experiments, optimal responses to conflict trials took longer than optimal responses to no-conflict trials, confirming the successful conflict inhibition and override of the heuristic answer across high-and low-bias reasoners.…”

“…However, we found no evidence of conflict detection in case of error, because response times for nonoptimal responses to conflict trials and optimal responses to noconflict trials did not differ. In light of the three-stage process model (Pennycook et al, 2015), it could be argued that the pairs of ratios that compose the trials of the ratio-bias task often cue two initial responses that are in conflict to each other in conflict trials: a ratio-bias response (preference for the largest numerator) and a logically correct response (preference for the largest ratio), even if the first one is likely to come to mind more fluently than the latter. Whenever this conflict is detected, participants engage in cognitive decoupling, inhibiting and overriding the more fluent heuristic response to give the logically correct response (Stanovich, 2009).…”

“…They interpreted these results as suggesting that nonoptimal responses (i.e., choosing the smallest ratio in conflict trials) are caused not by a lack of conflict detection but by a failure to resolve the conflict after conflict detection. However, failures of conflict detection and conflict inhibition can be better evaluated by respectively comparing the response times of nonoptimal and optimal responses to conflict trials to the response times of optimal responses to no-conflict trials (De Neys, 2012;Pennycook et al, 2015). We expect to replicate the main features of Bonner and Newell's response-time analysis, but we will also analyze response time as a function of accuracy to look for the hallmarks of conflict detection and conflict inhibition in the ratio-bias task.…”

“…Recently, Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler (2015) proposed a three-stage process model of analytic engagement, according to which reasoning problems may potentially cue multiple competing Type 1 outputs even if some of these initial outputs are more fluently processed than others (Thompson, 2009). If no conflict is detected (either because Type 1 processes did not produce competing outputs or because of conflict-detection failures) the first initial (more fluently processed) Type 1 output will be accepted with cursory analytic (Type 2) processes.…”

The time course of conflict on the Cognitive Reflection Test

“…Mevel et al, 2014;Pennycook, Fugelsang & Koehler, 2015), we also calculated the number of heuristic responses given by each participant on conflict problems, and categorized each of the 128 participants who made at least one heuristic response as either "majority heuristic" (3 or 4 heuristic responses out of four, 53 participants) or "minority heuristic" (1 or 2 heuristic responses, 75 participants). We entered this measure as a participant-level predictor in our models, but found that it was not involved with any interactions in the analyses above (t's < 1, p's > .4).…”