The effect of source credibility on bullshit receptivity

Abstract

Summary Pseudo‐profound bullshit pertains to grammatically and syntactically correct but meaningless sentences, that, due to syntactical correctness appear as made to communicate something and research shows that people deem them profound. However, the effect of differing source credibility on bullshit profoundness evaluations has, to our knowledge, not yet been tested. We presented participants with pseudo‐profound bullshit alone and with authors of different credibility. In order to partly replicate and extend on the findings regarding mechanisms of receptivity and sensitivity to bullshit we collected profoundness evaluations for mundane statements and proverbs, and different measures of analytic thinking. Ascribing credible authors leads to an increase while ascribing uncredible authors leads to a decrease in profoundness evaluations. Cognitive reflection protects against the tendency to evaluate any type of statement as profound and drives better differentiation between pseudo‐ and conventionally truly profound, while positive views about actively open‐minded thinking enable stronger effects of uncredible authorship.

Not all bullshit pondered is tossed: Reflection decreases receptivity to some types of misleading information but not others

“…We also found no significant effect of source, which was surprising given that past studies have found that pseudo-profound bullshit is rated as more profound when attributed to credible or expert sources than when no source is given (Gligori c & Vilotijevi c, 2020; Hoogeveen et al, 2022;Ili c & Damnjanovi c, 2021). However, much of the bullshit that people are exposed to is encountered online (Simpson, 2019) and the way that we presented our stimuli is noticeably dissimilar to the visual formats more common to the ways in which misinformation is often presented online, particularly on social media (e.g., memes, fake news headlines, social media comments, etc.).…”

“…Hoogeveen et al (2022) found a significant effect of source for pseudo‐profound bullshit statements when presented in a visual format more similar to online memes that people often encounter while on social media. Likewise, Ilić and Damnjanović (2021) presented bullshit statements in a similar way to how inspirational quotes are often shared online, with detailed references (randomly assigned to each statement) which included an author name followed by a year, a location where the statement was purportedly made, and a source (e.g., book, interview, or letter) for each statement.…”

“…Crucially, much of the bullshit that people encounter is online, particularly social media, where sources of bullshit information are more obvious (e.g., Tweets from public figures), or can at least be reasonably inferred (The Pearson Institute et al, 2021). Therefore, the second goal of the present study is to investigate to what extent purported "guru effects" might influence our results and whether engaging in explanatory reflection can help to attenuate them (Ili c & Damnjanovi c, 2021;Sperber, 2010).…”

“…People often perceive bullshit statements from purported experts as more meaningful and convincing than bullshit attributed to anonymous sources, a phenomenon known as the "guru effect" or the "Einstein effect" (Gligori c & Vilotijevi c, 2020;Hoogeveen et al, 2022;Ili c & Damnjanovi c, 2021;Sperber, 2010). In other words, people find meaningless statements more meaningful when they come from a person who is highly respected or perceived to be an authority.…”

Generalizability, Replicability, and New Insights Derived From Registered Reports Within Understudied Populations

“…Rachev and colleagues (2022) examine whether the risky-choice and attribute framing effect, describing variation in preference under different presentations of the same problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), occurs and shows similar relations to the willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms across two samples. The willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms were represented by two constructs; namely, actively open-minded thinking (Haran et al, 2013) and bullshit receptivity (e.g., Ilić & Damnjanović, 2021). The authors found that the susceptibility to framing was associated with these two constructs in both samples, with a stronger negative relation of susceptibility to framing with actively open-minded thinking in Bulgaria than in North America.…”