Federalism and Electoral Authoritarianism under Putin

Controlling Immigration Manually: Lessons from Moscow (Russia)

“…That these arenas have come under increasing authoritarian control since the beginning of the Putin presidency is welldocumented in the literature (Ross 2005;Lipman 2005;Remington 2006). The idea that Russia's ruling elite rely on manual control, or personal intervention in the policy process, has recently been cited as strategy to maintain political power at critical moments of public backlash (Petrov, Lipman & Hale 2010).…”

“…Typically, discussions of the vertical of power are centred on changes made to the federal system (Ross 2005;Konitzer & Wegren 2006;Pomeranz 2009;Hahn 2001). But the vertical of power is much less about creating a uniform legal space than it is about ensuring loyalty to the regime at all levels, from the party system (Reuter & Remington 2009) to regional executives (Slider 2008) to the media (Becker 2004) to the public (Petrov, Lipman & Hale 2010).…”

“…This is an example of preventative manual control, as it was used to centralize authority and decision-making in the absence of a tipping point or exogenous shock. Central control was further solidified when legislation was passed in 2004 that carved out legal space for the president to appoint regional executives (Ross 2005;Wilson 2006). The reform was justified on the basis of an exogenous shock (the terrorist attack at Beslan), though it can also be seen as a preventative strategy in the sense that it creates ongoing Kremlin discretion over regional affairs.…”

“…The reform was justified on the basis of an exogenous shock (the terrorist attack at Beslan), though it can also be seen as a preventative strategy in the sense that it creates ongoing Kremlin discretion over regional affairs. Not only did this move insulate the regime from potential electoral defeat (Reuter & Remington 2009), but it ensured that only those loyal to Putin would be awarded political appointments (Slider 2008;Ross 2005). Sakwa (2010, p. 194) calls both of these reforms "para-constitutional" because they create space for the regime to function outside the constitution without explicitly violating it.…”

“…During Putin's presidency, manual control was exercised through presidential decree (ukaz) (as in the creation of seven federal districts), through firm control of the Duma (enabling legislation to rescind gubernatorial elections) (Ross 2005), or through informal institutions such as "telephone justice" where judicial independence is subverted for political purposes (Ledeneva 2008;Hendley 2009;Goldman 2005;Sakwa 2010). That quotas are issued by government decree (postanovlenie) and that this power is explicitly defined in the 2007 legislation institutionalizes the opportunity for Putin to exercise manual control, transforming the previously emasculated office of prime minister into one that is central to the functions of the political system.…”