Controlling Immigration Manually: Lessons from Moscow (Russia)

Abstract

In 2007, the Russian government instituted quotas for immigrant work permits that have consistently been lower than actual labour demand. While low quotas are politically popular on the mass level, this article argues that low quotas are also a tool of the government to distribute patronage resources to regional political and economic elites. Decisions about quotas are firmly in the hands of prime minister Putin, giving him a powerful tool to control the immigration process and labour market manually. While this manual control is effective in the short-term to manage contentious policy arenas, it suffers a number of long term consequences.

Policy Streams and Immigration to Russia: Competing and Complementary Interests at the Federal and Local Levels

“…The Soviet Union had elaborate regulations governing internal migration, but scholars debated whether these policies had any meaningful influence on migration patterns (for examples of arguments that Soviet migration policy was largely irrelevant, see Grandstaff, ; Kerbey, ; for arguments that Soviet policies did have meaninful impacts, see Buckley, ; Author et al, 1995). A similar debate exists today over the relevance and logic of migration policy in the Russian Federation (see Korobkov, ; Robarts, ; Schenk, ).…”

Russia as a “Divided Nation,” from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy

“…The Duma did not pass this bill but it did directly inspire a November 2006 law prohibiting foreigners from trading in Russian markets. 29 At the same time Andrei Saveliev, then Rodina's number two and vice-president of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, became the linchpin of the rapprochement between some MPs and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), led by Alexander Belov. The DPNI not only dramatically contributed to making the migration issue one of the most debated topics in the Russian media but also fomented anti-migrant riots, especially the first big one in Kondopoga, by recruiting skinheads.…”

Labour Migration Policy in Russia: Considerations on Governmentality

“…Whereas Soviet governmentality, which originated restrictive governance methods in Russia, was subordinate to the imperative of exercising state control over the labour market and the housing supply, the present administrative bodies and the police regard migrant workers’ lack of documents as a source of personal enrichment (Light, ). Consequently, the motivation of decision‐makers corresponds not to the interests of the national economy but rather to the material benefits of certain groups – officials, security agencies, regional governments and big business (Schenk, ; Malakhov, ). As a result, numerous attempts to liberalize legislation on migration, that is, to simplify the procedures for the legalization of foreign workers, have never been successfully brought to completion.…”

“…Furthermore, in 2007 a quota for the issuance of 6 million work permits was established, but in the following year (2008) the quota was reduced by almost half – to 3.4 million. This pushed a great number of foreign workers who were already in Russian territory into the shadow economy (Schenk, ). Finally, in 2009, at the height of the global economic crisis, the government took measures to restore the fixed binding of foreign worker to employer, and thus the situation reverted to that preceding the reform of 2006–2007.…”

“…Over the past decade and a half, a significant body of literature exploring the immigration policy of post‐Soviet Russia has accumulated (Andrienko and Guriev, ; Zayonchkovskaya, ; Korobkov, ; Heleniak, ; Robarts, ; Ivakhnyuk, ; Balzer and Repnikova, ; Light, ; Schenk, ; Turukanova et al., ; Malakhov ; Schenk, ). Many of these studies reveal the thinking behind the decision‐making concerning migration regulation in Russia.…”