Decisions on decentralization versus centralization come as a result of strategic choices made by politicians after weighing their costs and benefits. In authoritarian regimes, the highest-priority political task is that of restraining political competition and securing power in the hands of the incumbent. This task incentivizes politicians to restrict political decentralization (or at least block reforms promoting such decentralization). At the same time, external economic pressures (e.g. globalization) place the task of national competitiveness in the global markets on the agenda, and increase incentives for fiscal and administrative decentralization. Thus, political and economic pressures create contradicting incentives, and in weighing costs and benefits, politicians in different authoritarian regimes make different choices that lead to variation in the form, degree and success of decentralization/centralization policies. In this article we compare authoritarian decentralization in Russia and Kazakhstan.
The Russian leadership promotes a vision of a multipolar world where major powers must have their own "zones of influence." This implies that other "great powers" have to recognize Moscow's sphere of dominance over the post-Soviet realm. It also makes Russia's neighbors increasingly reluctant to delegate their sovereignty to institutions of regional integration, as those are likely to become instruments of Russian domination. As the partners do not trust Russia, they insist on a limited character of integration projects. Russia is more likely to be successful in using asymmetric bilateral bargains rather than multilateral institutions to dominate the post-Soviet region.
In this article, we explore the inherent trade-offs and inconsistencies of Russia’s policies toward the post-Soviet space. We argue that attempts to rebuild an image of Russia as a “great power” have actually led to a reduction of Russian influence in the post-Soviet region. The more Russia acted as a “Great Power,” the less credible was its promise to respect the national sovereignty of the former Soviet republics. In 2011, Vladimir Putin declared that during his next term as president, his goal would be to establish a powerful supra-national Eurasian Union capable of becoming one of the poles in a multipolar world. However, Russia’s attempt to force Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union provoked the 2014 crisis. The Ukrainian crisis has de-facto completed the separation of Ukraine and Russia and made successful post-Soviet re-integration around Russia improbable.
This article examines the relationship between heads of regional administrations (governors) and the federal government in Russia since 1992. It looks at the methods with which governors have enhanced their powers vis-a-vis Moscow and at the policies of the federal authorities aimed at preserving some form of control over regional officials. The article argues that the gubernatorial elections of September 1996–March 1997, which gave almost all governors a popular mandate, will not considerably change the balance of power in center-periphery relations, despite fears to this effect among members of the Presidential Administration.
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