Faut-il limiter le cumul des fonctions dans les conseils d'administration ?

Godard, Laurence; Schatt, Alain

doi:10.3917/rsg.213.0061

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…We can finally point out that our achieved results appear to be consistent with the studies conducted by John K and Senbet L, Lipton and Lorsch, Fama and Jensen, Zahra, Godard and Schatt, and Boyd which have demonstrates the impact of Board of Directors on the performance and accounting conservatism within companies [8,17,26,28,[58][59][60].…”

Section: Regression Analysissupporting

confidence: 79%

“…This result suggests that the impact of the accounting conservatism on the company's performance is less favorable in companies where the function of the CEO and of the Chairman of the Board are performed by the same person compared to the companies where there is separation of both functions. Such a conclusion is also supported by the previous literature review [28,59,60]. This is in line with the input supported by the Agency theory which considers the combination of functions as a potential source of conflicts of interest.…”

Section: Regression Analysissupporting

confidence: 78%

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Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Performance: The Moderati ng Effect of the Board of Directors

Affes¹,

Sardouk²

2016

J Bus Fin Aff

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the board ensures the control over the financial reporting [7]. On the other hand, John and Senbet and Fama argue that the characteristics of the board can have an effect on the quality of financial reporting [8,9]. Actually, the board is the main source of annual and quarterly information for the shareholders [10]. Its role main function is to actively supervise the management team and redirect it when necessary [11,12]. It comes directly from the shareholders' votes and can prompt the leaders to provide high quality information. According to Mizruchi, being a member of several boards provides administrators with an important source of information on practices and corporate policies [13]. It is a determinant positively associated with the directors' perception of their ability to contribute to board's debates [14].Since the board is a supervisory body the effectiveness of which is essential, it would be interesting to analyze its impact on the relationship between the quality of the accounting information represented by the level of the accounting conservatism and the company's performance. In this sense, we seek to answer the following question: What is the contribution of the Board of directors to the relationship between accounting conservatism and corporate performance? For this purpose, it would be necessary to consider the moderating effect of this mechanism. Embedding this effect within our analysis helps improve the existing literature and complete the analyses dealing with this issue.The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we begin with a brief survey of the empirical literature. The description of the sample data and variables as well as the presentation and discusses of our empirical findings will be figured in a next part. Literature Review and Hypothesis DevelopmentAs an internal mechanism of the governance system, the board Keywords: Board of directors; Moderating effect; Accounting conservatism; Performance IntroductionWe are currently witnessing a set of recommendations about governance and the quality of the accounting information disclosed by large companies. Such recommendations can detect the defects in order to deal with and control them [1]. In this context, accounting conservatism is a tool which is often used to assess the quality of the accounting standards. According to Cadbury and Mallin, the governance system needs a good quality of information to eliminate or reduce the information asymmetry between the company's executives and their stakeholders [2,3]. The governance systems can still counter balance the power and affect the relationship between the quality of the accounting information and performance. Its role is essential in terms of actors and tools. According to Gray, the accounting conservatism is a prudent accounting measure in the face of uncertainty of future events. This practice varies according to the European accounting or Anglo-Saxon systems [4]. Bebchuck and Roe identified two sources of dependency on corporate governance [5]. The first is guided by the ...

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Section: Regression Analysissupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Regression Analysissupporting

confidence: 78%

Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Performance: The Moderati ng Effect of the Board of Directors

Affes¹,

Sardouk²

2016

J Bus Fin Aff

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Several previous researches opted for this measure, such as Brickley et al (1997), Godard and Schatt (2000) Chtourou et al, (2001) and Zeghal et al, (2006).…”

Section: Explanatory Variablementioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants of the Quality of Financial Information Disclosed by French Listed Companies

Jouini

2013

MJSS

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“…Certes, la composition optimale du CA serait toute autre dans une optique privilégiant par exemple les compétences des administrateurs, ou l'accès à des ressources rares, c'est-à-dire si l'on se focalise sur le problème de création de valeur plutôt que sur celui de répartition de valeur défendu par les partisans de la théorie de l'agence (Charreaux, 2004). Le CA devrait alors être composé de nombreux membres et, de préférence, des membres internes à l'entreprise ou des membres externes affiliés aux dirigeants (Godard et Schatt, 2000). D'une part, les compétences (liées à une meilleure connaissance de l'entreprise) apportées par les administrateurs sont supérieures et, d'autre part, les membres affiliés (par exemple, des fournisseurs de matières ou des banquiers) facilitent l'accès à certaines ressources.…”

Section: -Les Caractéristiques Des Conseils D'administrationunclassified

Caractéristiques et fonctionnement des conseils d'administration français. Un état des lieux

Godard¹,

Schatt²

2005

Revue française de gestion

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Faut-il limiter le cumul des fonctions dans les conseils d'administration ?

Cited by 14 publications

References 17 publications

Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Performance: The Moderati ng Effect of the Board of Directors

Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Performance: The Moderati ng Effect of the Board of Directors

The Determinants of the Quality of Financial Information Disclosed by French Listed Companies

Caractéristiques et fonctionnement des conseils d'administration français. Un état des lieux

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