SUMMARY Since 2003, French auditors must disclose justifications of assessments (JOAs) in expanded audit reports. Like critical audit matters recently introduced in the U.S., and key audit matters introduced by international standard setters, the purpose of JOAs is to enhance the informative value of audit reports. Based on French audit reports from 2002 to 2011, we analyze the impact of first-time implementation of JOAs, and the impact of new JOAs in subsequent years, on investors (measured by abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume) and on the audit (measured by audit report lag, abnormal accruals, and audit fees). For both first-time implementation of JOAs and new JOAs in subsequent years, we find no significant market reaction to their disclosure and no significant effect on audit report lag, audit quality, and audit fees. Our results suggest that the French expanded audit report did not have the expected consequences on investors and the audit.

This paper seeks to contribute to the international literature by researching the factors influencing audit fees in France. The French case is specific because the law requires a joint auditing process involving two separate auditors for firms that publish consolidated financial statements. Since 2003, the disclosure of audit fees has been compulsory in France, but numerous firms decided to voluntarily disclose their audit fees for the year 2002. We attempt here to elucidate the amount spent on audit fees in 2002 in a sample of 127 French (nonfinancial) firms. The main finding is that audit fees depend on firm size, firm risk, and the presence of two of the Big Four firms. When two Big Four firms audit company accounts, the fees charged (adjusted for company size) are significantly lower in comparison with those paid in the other cases. These results appear not to have been influenced by the share of fees paid by the companies to the main auditor.

This paper investigates the financial characteristics and changes in performance of French companies involved in a leveraged buy-out. The empirical study covers a sample of 161 MBOs in France from 1988 to 1994. The acquired firms outperform their counterparts in the same sector of activity before and after the buy-out. However, unlike findings concerning LBOs in the USA and the UK, the performance of French firms falls after the operation is completed. This downturn in performance seems to be less detrimental to former subsidiaries of groups than to former family businesses. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002.

No abstract

No abstract