Caractéristiques et fonctionnement des conseils d'administration français. Un état des lieux

Godard, Laurence; Schatt, Alain

doi:10.3166/rfg.158.69-88

Cited by 54 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 6 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…Thus, they are more effective than inside directors in the control and discipline of the manager (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990;Byrd & Hickman, 1992). Indeed, Godard and Schatt (2004) put forward the idea that outside directors have an important role in the effectiveness of the diversification strategy in line with shareholders' wealth. This variable is measured by the proportion of the outide directors in the board.…”

Section: H1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Marouan¹

2015

IJBM

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of the board of directors and the management entrenchment in the explanation of diversification strategy of the Tunisian firms. In particular we focus on the characteristics of these two opposite directions bodies where the first controls the second in explaining the strategic choices of the firm. We find evidence for the negative effect of the board size and outside directors on the diversification strategy of the firm. The empirical result points also the negative effect of the CEO duality, which is inconsistent with the agency hypothesis.

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Section: H1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Marouan¹

2015

IJBM

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“…In the same line of thought, Godard and Schatt (2005) noted that a large board size can ensure firm to run efficiently and to monitor managers carefully. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that ownership concentration is negatively related with board size.…”

Section: The Interaction Among Internal and External Governance Mechamentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Information Transparency: A Simultaneous Equations Approach

Kachouri

Jarboui

2017

Asian Economic and Financial Review

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Article HistoryThe purpose of this paper is to review the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and information transparency. In this paper, we aim to answer the important questions of whether corporate governance affects financial information transparency, if so, whether transparency reporting can affects corporate governance mechanisms and the interaction of internal and external governance mechanisms. This study uses a sample of 28 non-financial listed Tunisian companies and covers an eight-year period from 2006 to 2013. To test the hypotheses of this research, a simultaneous equation system model was applied. The results obtained shows that, for the Tunisians companies, financial transparency have a significant effect on board size and on audit quality. The current study also provides evidence that corporate governance mechanisms are interdependent. The findings may be of interest to those academic researchers, practitioners and regulators who are interested in discovering corporate governance practices in Tunisian context. This paper extends the existing literature, in the Tunisian context in particular, by examining the causal relationship between corporate governance and information transparency.

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“…Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. www.erudit.org Divers auteurs ont tenté de démontrer que l'efficacité du conseil d'administration, définie comme sa capacité à protéger les intérêts des actionnaires, dépend de ses caractéristiques, et notamment de la nature des administrateurs, de la taille du conseil et de la présidence de celui-ci (Godard et Schatt, 2000). Ce dernier point a récemment fait l'objet d'une attention particulière.…”

Section: Résumé De L'articleunclassified

Faut-il limiter le cumul des fonctions dans les conseils d’administration? Le cas français

Godard¹,

Schatt²

2017

gouvernance

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Les risques liés à la présence du décideur au sein de l’organe de contrôle ont été évoqués à de nombreuses reprises au cours des dernières années et ont été à l’origine de modifications réglementaires récentes en France. Nous vérifions dans ce travail, sur un échantillon de 2037 entreprises françaises, si la performance financière à long terme diffère entre les entreprises ayant adopté une structure où les fonctions de décision et de contrôle sont séparées et celles caractérisées par un cumul des fonctions. Nous trouvons que le cumul des fonctions n’est pas néfaste pour les actionnaires.The risks associated with the presence of executives on the control body of firms have been discussed on several occasions in recent years and they were at the origins of recent regulatory changes in France. In this paper, on the basis of a sample of 2037 French firms, we examine whether long-term financial performance differs between firms that have adopted the separation of decision and control functions and those that are characterized by the combination of these functions. We find that the combination of these functions does not have a negative impact on shareholders

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Caractéristiques et fonctionnement des conseils d'administration français. Un état des lieux

Cited by 54 publications

References 6 publications

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Corporate Governance and Information Transparency: A Simultaneous Equations Approach

Faut-il limiter le cumul des fonctions dans les conseils d’administration? Le cas français

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