2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1639158
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Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control

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Cited by 66 publications
(128 citation statements)
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References 20 publications
(3 reference statements)
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“…Preferences such as nepotism may rob a firm of managerial talent 13 and parental altruism may cause undeserving family employees to shirk their managerial and stewardship responsibilities 14 . A desire for family perquisites from the business may drain capital needed for innovation, as would the financial conservatism stemming from a reluctance to jeopardize family control by issuing debt or equity 15 . Moreover, cronyism born of some kinship and family ties may constrain the broader network of talent and the knowledge resources required for innovation.…”
Section: A Typology Of Family Business Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Preferences such as nepotism may rob a firm of managerial talent 13 and parental altruism may cause undeserving family employees to shirk their managerial and stewardship responsibilities 14 . A desire for family perquisites from the business may drain capital needed for innovation, as would the financial conservatism stemming from a reluctance to jeopardize family control by issuing debt or equity 15 . Moreover, cronyism born of some kinship and family ties may constrain the broader network of talent and the knowledge resources required for innovation.…”
Section: A Typology Of Family Business Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…La variable TAMAÑO representa la dimensión de la empresa y es medida como el logaritmo natural de los activos totales (González, Guzmán, Pombo & Trujillo, 2013). El ENDEUDAMIENTO es calculado como el cociente entre el pasivo total y el activo total (Wintoki et al, 2012).…”
Section: Variables De Controlunclassified
“…A stronger negative relation can be observed when there is the founder presence. But for old firms this family effect changes and becomes positive in financial performance (González, Guzmán, Pombo, Trujillo, 2013). Based on the research evidence collected in European countries, researchers argue that in general, family control in Western Europe leads to the higher profitability of the company and market value (Bartoni, Caprio, 2006;Maury, 2006 and support for the U-shaped relation between the ratio of family members in the TMT and firm performance (Minichilli, Corbetta, MacMilan, 2010).…”
Section: Literature Overviewmentioning
confidence: 99%