False Targets in Defending Systems against Two Sequential Attacks

Levitin, Gregory; Hausken, Kjell; Haim, Hanoch Ben

doi:10.5711/1082598319119

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…False nodes deployed in CPPS are treated as decoys to attract attackers. It is a useful defense measure against various attacks [23]. It is assumed that the attacker can not distinguish between real nodes and false nodes.…”

Section: Active Defense Strategy Based On Vulnerability Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Active and Passive Defense Strategies of Cyber-Physical Power System against Cyber Attacks Considering Node Vulnerability

Shi

Wang

et al. 2022

Processes

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Vulnerable parts in the cyber-physical power system can be maliciously attacked to trigger cascading failures. This paper proposes a defense framework with active and passive defense hybrid strategies. First, a comprehensive vulnerability assessment index is presented to identify vital nodes contributing to failure extension. The proposed index is based on both physical characteristics and topology. Physical characteristic is assessed through the optimal power flow to calculate the load losses. The topology index is obtained by the attacking node and calculating the nodes lost at the steady state. Then, the active and passive defense strategies are established. Deploying false nodes based on the comprehensive vulnerability index is set as the active defense strategy. Changing from centralized control mode to centralized-distributed control mode is the passive defense strategy. The system can defend against attacks with active and passive strategies effectively in the attacking experiments. Finally, we have made a profound study of the first-order percolation problem. The first-order percolation disappears under the active and passive defense strategies in a scale-free network, while the small world network transfers from the first-order percolation to the second-order percolation. The findings indicated that the diverse results resulted from their structure.

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Section: Active Defense Strategy Based On Vulnerability Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Active and Passive Defense Strategies of Cyber-Physical Power System against Cyber Attacks Considering Node Vulnerability

Shi

Wang

et al. 2022

Processes

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“…In light of the fact that players lack full information about the opponent's goals, target valuation, plans, or resources, other models have dealt with the optimization of the defender (attacker) decision, taking into account incomplete information (Bier, Haphuriwat, Menoyo, Zimmerman, & Culpen, ; Hausken & Levitin, ; He & Zhuang, ; Levitin, Gertsbakh, & Shpungin, ; Zhuang & Bier, ). For example, one might assume that with no information about the attacker's actions, the defender explores an optimal defense strategy under the assumption of the worst‐case (or selected) attack scenarios, in which the attacker tries to maximize his/her expected damage in an attack (Levitin, , ; Levitin & Hausken, , ; Peng, Levitin, Xie, & Ng, ; Ramirez‐Marquez, Rocco, & Levitin, ). It is worth noting that in the models with incomplete information, even though subjective beliefs (probability distributions) are to be assigned to player characteristics, in Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (), Harsanyi (), and Hausken (), it is suggested that Bayes’s rule is applied if the opponent(s) actions are observed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adversarial Risk Analysis to Allocate Optimal Defense Resources for Protecting Cyber–Physical Systems from Cyber Attacks

2019

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Defenders have to enforce defense strategies by taking decisions on allocation of resources to protect the integrity and survivability of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) from intentional and malicious cyber attacks. In this work, we propose an adversarial risk analysis approach to provide a novel one-sided prescriptive support strategy for the defender to optimize the defensive resource allocation, based on a subjective expected utility model, in which the decisions of the adversaries are uncertain. This increases confidence in cyber security through robustness of CPS protection actions against uncertain malicious threats compared with prescriptions provided by a classical defend-attack game-theoretical approach. We present the approach and the results of its application to a nuclear CPS, specifically the digital instrumentation and control system of the advanced lead-cooled fast reactor European demonstrator.

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Trade-Off Between Redundancy, Protection, and Imperfect False Targets in Defending Parallel Systems

Xiao

Peng

2017

Springer Series in Reliability Engineering

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False Targets in Defending Systems against Two Sequential Attacks

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Active and Passive Defense Strategies of Cyber-Physical Power System against Cyber Attacks Considering Node Vulnerability

Active and Passive Defense Strategies of Cyber-Physical Power System against Cyber Attacks Considering Node Vulnerability

Adversarial Risk Analysis to Allocate Optimal Defense Resources for Protecting Cyber–Physical Systems from Cyber Attacks

Trade-Off Between Redundancy, Protection, and Imperfect False Targets in Defending Parallel Systems

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