“…A more detailed assessment of the role of religion in shaping ethnic identities of Sunni and Shi'a (Twelver and Ismaili) Hazaras was conducted by Canfield (1973, p.5) who found that there was a ‘close correlation between ethnicity and sect affiliation’. The correlation between ethnicity and sect was so significant that if Hazaras converted from Shi'a to Sunni Islam they were also considered to have become Tajiks.…”
Section: The Shi'a and Sunni Hazarasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Not only have individual Hazaras become Tajiks but even whole groups of Hazaras in some areas may have made this transition. The Tatars of Turkestan were once known as Hazara Tatars and bear strong Mongoloid features, but today they call themselves “Tajiks” and are Sunnis (Canfield, 1973, p.17).…”
In recent years, a growing number of activists in Afghanistan have been proactively self‐identifying as Sunni Hazaras. The trend demonstrates an important shift that illuminates how ethnic boundaries may change and evolve in response to elite politics and state policies in Afghanistan. Many of the communities that are the subjects of new collective identity discourses share important commonalities, including shared belief in a common origin, with the Shi'a Hazaras. However, because the Shi'a Hazaras were persecuted and marginalised under successive regimes in Afghanistan, it was not common for these communities to publicly identify as Hazaras. Instead, they tended to identify with local identity categories such as those based on places of origin or as Tajiks because, like most Tajiks, they speak Dari and practise Sunni Islam. This article contributes to understanding these dynamics through a detailed examination of the National Council of the Sunni Hazaras of Afghanistan. Taking a social constructivist approach, it develops an argument that emphasises an interactive process between state formation and top‐down programmes of national identity construction and bottom‐up resistance by groups that appropriate and articulate ethnic and other forms of ethnic identities to demand political representation and symbolic recognition.
“…A more detailed assessment of the role of religion in shaping ethnic identities of Sunni and Shi'a (Twelver and Ismaili) Hazaras was conducted by Canfield (1973, p.5) who found that there was a ‘close correlation between ethnicity and sect affiliation’. The correlation between ethnicity and sect was so significant that if Hazaras converted from Shi'a to Sunni Islam they were also considered to have become Tajiks.…”
Section: The Shi'a and Sunni Hazarasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Not only have individual Hazaras become Tajiks but even whole groups of Hazaras in some areas may have made this transition. The Tatars of Turkestan were once known as Hazara Tatars and bear strong Mongoloid features, but today they call themselves “Tajiks” and are Sunnis (Canfield, 1973, p.17).…”
In recent years, a growing number of activists in Afghanistan have been proactively self‐identifying as Sunni Hazaras. The trend demonstrates an important shift that illuminates how ethnic boundaries may change and evolve in response to elite politics and state policies in Afghanistan. Many of the communities that are the subjects of new collective identity discourses share important commonalities, including shared belief in a common origin, with the Shi'a Hazaras. However, because the Shi'a Hazaras were persecuted and marginalised under successive regimes in Afghanistan, it was not common for these communities to publicly identify as Hazaras. Instead, they tended to identify with local identity categories such as those based on places of origin or as Tajiks because, like most Tajiks, they speak Dari and practise Sunni Islam. This article contributes to understanding these dynamics through a detailed examination of the National Council of the Sunni Hazaras of Afghanistan. Taking a social constructivist approach, it develops an argument that emphasises an interactive process between state formation and top‐down programmes of national identity construction and bottom‐up resistance by groups that appropriate and articulate ethnic and other forms of ethnic identities to demand political representation and symbolic recognition.
Afghanistan's estimated population of thirty million people is divided into six major ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimaq, and Turkman. The population outside these groups constitutes a much smaller proportion and consists of Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Pamiri, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur and Brahui. Thirty different language communities have been identified in Afghanistan, and multilingualism is common. Dari (Persian) and Pashto function as the country's two main linguae francae, Dari playing an outsized role in government administration, commerce, and education. The population in each ethnic group and its proportion to the whole is subject to controversy. No Afghan government has ever published a comprehensive census. As a result, representatives of ethnic groups tend to inflate estimates of their own numbers while minimizing the population of rival groups. Thus the ruling Pashtuns insist that they constitute the country's majority, while the disadvantaged Hazaras claim their population has always been deliberately underestimated.
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