Externalizing EU crisis management: EU orchestration of the OSCE during the Ukrainian conflict

Abstract

Despite the Lisbon Treaty's modifications in the foreign and security policy domain, the EU has frequently relied on third parties to address external conflicts and crises. Using the Ukrainian conflict as a case study, this article adopts the orchestration model to explain why and how the EU enlists intermediary actors over which it has no formal control to pursue its objectives. It finds that in this conflict the EU outsourced part of its crisis management activities to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe because it lacked the civilian and military capabilities, as well as the regulatory competence and reputation to challenge Russia. Indeed, the Ukrainian case shows that orchestration has emerged as a crucial governance arrangement for the functioning of EU crisis management, raising serious questions about the EU overall capacity to act as a security provider in an international system marred by contestation and hard security concerns.

Informal groupings as types of differentiated cooperation in EU foreign policy: the cases of Kosovo, Libya, and Syria

“…The central argument of the article is that the emergence of informal groupings can be ascribed to problems associated with the European integration of core state powers. In this sense, informal groupings can be conceived as coping strategies that the EU devises, alongside externalization of its crisis management activities to third parties (Amadio Viceré, 2021), to address the heterogeneity of member states' preferences and its lack of capacitybuilding in areas corresponding to key functions of state sovereignty.…”

“…Often, however, it has been informal groups of member states that have determined the EU's general approach (Sus, 2023). As in the case of the Normandy Format, these groups have used the High Representative and EU structures as administrative support while benefitting from EU resources (Amadio Viceré, 2018Viceré, , 2021Interviews A, Q).…”

Rescaling the legal dimensions of grey zones: Evidence from Ukraine

“…Although the main efforts of the OSCE in Ukraine before 2022 were focused on impartial monitoring and information gathering in the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine, its main achievement was organisation and mediation within the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, including subgroups on humanitarian and security issues, which was headed by the head of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, and involved representatives of the self‐declared DPR and LPR. The main quantifiable results of the dialogue, which was led by the OSCE, were the organisation of humanitarian corridors, the exchange of prisoners, and the release of civilian hostages; but the activities of the trilateral contact group and more grassroots formats were critically dependent on cooperation both with state actors (Kyiv and Moscow) and the authorities of the self‐proclaimed republics (Guliyev & Gawrich, 2021; Viceré, 2021).…”

Responsible Leadership in Crisis Management: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis and Russia-Ukraine War

“…Yanuko-vych's leadership was also marked by allegations of corruption and human rights abuses, which contributed to widespread protests and ultimately led to his removal from office in 2014. As per Debora (2021), Yanukovych's leadership style reflects a disregard for responsible leadership principles, including transparency, ethical decision-making, and a to promoting the broader social, economic, and environmental interests of the population (Amadio Viceré, 2021). His approach to leadership contributed to the destabilization of Ukraine and the deterioration of its relationship with the global community.…”