Expressivism and realist explanations

Abstract

It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between expressivism and normative realism: more precisely, that the two views offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism.

Is expressivism theologically acceptable?

“…According to expressivism, it is this categorical approval of God that is expressed when we say 'God would be good whether or not we approve of him' (cf. Golub, 2017Golub, , p. 1388. For further discussion, see Blackburn (1984, pp.…”

The real and the quasi-real: problems of distinction

“…In each case I say a little about why the alternative method does not capture the distinction that most interests me, but the main point is just to see how different tests may capture different distinctions. As Camil Golub (2017) sensibly says, ‘I want to avoid the trap of treating realism as something the sharp contours of which we should all be able to recognize upon reflection’ (1392).…”

“…Camil Golub (2017) thinks the effort of redrawing the old distinction has amounted to wasted ink. The paper takes apart a number of attempts to partition the realist from the Quasi-realist accounts, using different useful tools to do the dismantling.…”

Solving the problem of creeping minimalism

“…This is a common point in the literature. In a recent paper Camil Golub rejects some proposed solutions to the problem of creeping minimalism for this reason (Golub 2017, 1392f; 1406). Many writers think this point is important for the wider debate about non-representational theories of meaning 18 .…”