The real and the quasi-real: problems of distinction

Abstract

This paper surveys some ways of distinguishing Quasi-Realism in metaethics (and I hope also in other areas) from Non-naturalist Realism, including ‘Explanationist’ methods of distinguishing, which characterize the Real by its explanatory role, and Inferentialist methods. Rather than seeking the One True Distinction, the paper adopts an irenic and pragmatist perspective, allowing that different ways of drawing the line are best for different purposes.

Global expressivism and alethic pluralism

“…' (2004, p. 42). Returning to these issues in (Dreier, 2018), Dreier calls this the explanationist proposal.…”

The Problems of Creeping Minimalism

“…That is the problem of creeping minimalism (PCM) as introduced by Jamie Dreier (2004, 2018) and much discussed in meta-ethics 2 . It threatens to radically undermine meta-ethical debate by removing our grip on what, if anything, is being disputed by the realist and the expressivist once the latter goes quasi 3 .…”

Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter

“…This threatens to make expressivism indistinguishable from rival views; James Dreier (2004) calls this the problem of creeping minimalism. Dreier (2018) defends what he calls an explanationist solution to the problem, which focuses not on whether ethical language and thought has the features mentioned above, like truthconditions, but whether we need to appeal to those features to explain what gives ethical sentences and beliefs their content. Dreier's ontological explanationism says that expressivism is distinctive in avoiding ethical ontology (facts and properties) when explaining ethical content.…”

“…Representational explanationism instead distinguishes expressivism by its evasion of concepts like truth, representation, and belief. However, Dreier (2018) argues that this is too open-ended and threatens to make minimalism entail expressivism not just about ethics but about all language, an unwelcome consequence for many.…”