Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter

Simpson, Matthew

doi:10.1017/can.2020.20

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…14 Obviously, the problem of so-called "creeping minimalism" in metaethics (Dreier, 2004)-i.e., how to distinguish moral expressivism from moral realism once the expressivist adopts semantic minimalism or deflationism-applies here. Here I merely point the reader to what I think is a promising way of solving this problem (Simpson, 2020). Adjusting Simpson's solution to the topic of modality, he would hold that normativism differs from its rivals by not having to appeal to modal facts to explain (the content of) modal language and thought.…”

Section: Conventionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

Povich

2024

ZFN

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Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).

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Section: Conventionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

Povich

2024

ZFN

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Should expressivists go global?

Simpson¹

2023

Philos Stud

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Moral expressivists think that moral thoughts and sentences don’t represent or describe the world, at least not in any interesting sense. Global expressivists think that no thoughts or sentences represent the world; local expressivists think that some do and others don’t. Huw Price has influentially argued that local expressivism collapses into global expressivism, due both to the effects of minimalist theories of representation and similar concepts, and to an unappreciated consequence of the success of specific expressivist theories like moral expressivism. In this paper I argue that Price’s arguments don’t succeed. While they can be fixed, doing so makes them miss their intended target. Local expressivists should therefore not be worried by Price’s arguments.

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Superspreading the word

Streumer

2023

Nous

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Quasi‐realists are expressivists who say much of what realists say. To avoid making their view indistinguishable from realism, however, they usually stop short of saying everything realists say. Many realists therefore think that something important is missing from quasi‐realism. I argue that quasi‐realists can undermine this thought by defending a version of quasi‐realism that I call super‐quasi‐realism. This version seems indistinguishable from realism, but I argue that this is a mistaken impression that arises because we cannot believe super‐quasi‐realism.

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Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter

Cited by 4 publications

References 30 publications

A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

Should expressivists go global?

Superspreading the word

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