Solving the problem of creeping minimalism

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier's ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.

Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism

“…The details of this explanatory divide can vary. On one proposal, for example, the relevant explanandum concerns the content of moral terms [Dreier 2004;Simpson 2018]. The explanatory question that metaphysically light and metaphysically heavy views answer differently would then be 'What explains the fact that words like "wrong" and "good" mean what they do?…”

“…Expressivists have replied by appeal to an explanatory divide along the above lines [ibid. ;Simpson 2018]. For a similar proposal in metaontology, seeThomasson [2014: 155].13 Simpson [2018] argues that we should understand the explanatory difference not in terms of the role that ontology plays-that is, whether the explanation of ethical thought and language includes normative properties or facts-but rather in terms of the role that the representational relation plays in the explanation.…”

The real and the quasi-real: problems of distinction

“…Matthew Simpson (2017) offers a version of Explanationism designed to shore up the problems in the kind I have defended. Simpson's innovation is to focus on the explanatory weight borne in a theory of meaning by what he calls representational properties and relations.…”

The Problems of Creeping Minimalism

“… 11 Tiefensee (2016, 2019). Others here include, at least, Asay (2013), Chrisman (2008), and Simpson (2018), and the aforementioned global expressivists/pragmatists.…”

“… 19 See Chrisman (2008), Tiefensee (2019), and Simpson (2018) for proposals similar to Dreier's in eschewing appeal to the notions upon which minimalism creeps and which, for that reason, my coming response also applies to.…”