Experimental Manipulations of Personal Control do Not Increase Illusory Pattern Perception

Abstract

We report seven experiments to investigate the effects of control threat manipulations on different measures of illusory pattern perception: magical thinking (Study 1-3), conspiracy beliefs (Study 4), paranormal beliefs (Study 5) and agent detection (Study 6 and 7). Overall we did not find evidence for an effect of control threat on any of our relevant dependent measures. By using Bayesian analyses we obtained positive evidence for the null-hypothesis that an experimentally induced loss of control does not affect illusory pattern perception. Finally, by re-conducting a recent meta-analysis we found strong evidence for publication bias and a relatively small effect size for control-threat manipulations. Together, these results cast doubt on the potential efficacy of experimental autobiographical recall manipulations to manipulate feelings of control.

Compensatory control and religious beliefs: a registered replication report across two countries

“…We found supportive evidence for a correlational effect consistent with predictions derived from CCT, namely: in the US sample overall feelings of control were related to belief in a controlling God. This finding is in line with previous observations by van Elk and Lodder (2018), who exploratorily found that general subjective feelings of control were associated with different dependent variables related to epistemic structuring tendencies across four of the seven experiments. This again suggests that it is difficult to manipulate feelings of control experimentally, but that relatively stable individual differences in the experience of control are associated with compensatory strategies in a way that is compatible with CCT.…”

“…Our findings cohere with those of van Elk and Lodder (2018). Across seven experiments they found no support for the effectiveness of various personal control manipulations, including the autobiographical recall task used in the present study.…”

“…Across seven experiments they found no support for the effectiveness of various personal control manipulations, including the autobiographical recall task used in the present study. Our suggestion that autobiographical recall manipulations may be ineffective echoes recent discussions in the priming literature, where the effectiveness of behavioral priming generally (Cesario, 2014;Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012;Pashler, Rohrer, & Harris, 2013;Shanks et al, 2013;Stroebe & Strack, 2014), and religious priming specifically (Gomes & McCullough, 2015;van Elk et al, 2015;van Elk, Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2016) was called into question. Some contested effects also included autobiographical recall manipulations, for instance with respect to experimental effects of feelings of power (e.g.…”

“…We used the meta-analytic effect size of δ ¼ :539 (r ¼ :24) reported by Landau et al (2015), as well as a corrected estimate of δ ¼ :379 (r ¼ :186) reported by van Elk and Lodder (2018) to calculate the achieved power of the original study. That is, van Elk and Lodder (2018) report that the standard errors of the studies included in the meta-analysis by Landau et al (2015) have been overestimated, possibly due to a coding error. As a consequence, the funnel plot asymmetry and hence the amount of missing studies and the extent of publication bias are underestimated.…”

What’s hidden in my filedrawer and what’s in yours? Disclosing Non-published Findings in the Cognitive Science of Religion

“…I have also had this experience and published my null findings on agency detection (van Elk, Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2016), mentalizing (D.L.R. and compensatory control (van Elk & Lodder, 2018) for instance. But in many cases the effort of getting our null-findings published is simply too costly.…”