Compensatory control and religious beliefs: a registered replication report across two countries

Abstract

Compensatory Control Theory (CCT) suggests that religious belief systems provide an external source of control that can substitute a perceived lack of personal control. In a seminal paper, it was experimentally demonstrated that a threat to personal control increases endorsement of the existence of a controlling God. In the current registered report, we conducted a high-powered (N = 829) direct replication of this effect, using samples from the Netherlands and the United States (US). Our results show moderate to strong evidence for the absence of an experimental effect across both countries: belief in a controlling God did not increase after a threat compared to an affirmation of personal control. In a complementary preregistered analysis, an inverse relation between general feelings of personal control and belief in a controlling God was found in the US, but not in the Netherlands. We discuss potential reasons for the replication failure of the experimental effect and cultural mechanisms explaining the crosscountry difference in the correlational effect. Together, our findings suggest that experimental manipulations of control may be ineffective in shifting belief in God, but that individual differences in the experience of control may be related to religious beliefs in a way that is consistent with CCT.

A Primer on Bayesian Model-Averaged Meta-Analysis

“…Below we outline how to address these questions using Bayesian hypothesis testing in combination with Bayesian model averaging. 3 We have applied this framework to analyze power posing studies (Gronau, van Erp, et al, 2017), to investigate the effectiveness of descriptive social norms in facilitating ecological behavior (Scheibehenne et al, 2017), to test the compensatory control theory (Hoogeveen et al, 2018), to analyze facial feedback replication studies (Hinne et al, 2019), to analyze how research results are influenced by subjective decisions that scientists make as they design studies (Landy et al, 2020), and to reanalyze the Many Labs 4 data (Haaf et al, 2020). Furthermore, we have applied this methodology to analyze a set of replication studies concerning the ego depletion effect (Vohs et al, in press).…”

“…Currently, the most popular analysis approach is still frequentist meta-analysis with p values and confidence intervals (e.g., Borenstein et al, 2009; Simons et al, 2014). Here we present a primer on an alternative method: Bayesian model-averaged meta-analysis (e.g., Gronau, van Erp, et al, 2017; Haaf et al, 2020; Hinne et al, 2019; Hoogeveen et al, 2018; Scheibehenne et al, 2017; Vohs et al, in press). This method combines the results of Bayesian fixed-effect and Bayesian random-effects models according to the models’ plausibilities given the data.…”

Advancing the Cognitive Science of Religion through Replication and Open Science

“…Various replications of priming studies failed to find compelling evidence: subtle reminders of religion do not increase risk taking (based on the divine protection hypothesis; Gervais et al, 2020, Kupor et al, 2015, do not decrease grip endurance (based on the sexual and reproductive religiosity model; Hone & McCullough, 2015, Mc-Cullough et al, 2012, religious priming does not increase dictator game allocations (based on the religion and prosociality link; Gomes & McCullough, 2015, Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007, and religious priming does not increase work ethic (based on the implicit puritanism account; Tierney et al, 2021, Uhlmann et al, 2011. In addition, analytical thinking primes do not decrease religiosity (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Sanchez et al, 2017) and threats to personal control do not increase belief in a controlling God (Hoogeveen et al, 2018;Kay et al, 2008). Keep in mind though, that these studies all concern social priming effects, the efficacy of which has been contested in general (Cesario, 2014;Doyen et al, 2012;Gilder & Heerey, 2018;Pashler et al, 2013;Shanks et al, 2013).…”

Advancing the Cognitive Science of Religion through Replication and Open Science

“…Various replications of priming studies failed to find compelling evidence: subtle reminders of religion do not increase risk taking (based on the divine protection hypothesis; Gervais et al, 2020, Kupor et al, 2015, do not decrease grip endurance (based on the sexual and reproductive religiosity model; Hone & McCullough, 2015, Mc-Cullough et al, 2012, religious priming does not increase dictator game allocations (based on the religion and prosociality link; Gomes & McCullough, 2015, Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007, and religious priming does not increase work ethic (based on the implicit puritanism account; Tierney et al, 2021, Uhlmann et al, 2011. In addition, analytical thinking primes do not decrease religiosity (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Sanchez et al, 2017) and threats to personal control do not increase belief in a controlling God (Hoogeveen et al, 2018;Kay et al, 2008). Keep in mind though, that these studies all concern social priming effects, the efficacy of which has been contested in general (Cesario, 2014;Doyen et al, 2012;Gilder & Heerey, 2018;Pashler et al, 2013;Shanks et al, 2013).…”

“…For direct replication attempts it may also be relevant to invite authors who were involved in the original study, in order to optimize the study design and to avoid getting into an argument after the study has been conducted. We had a very good experience of conducting a direct replication in collaboration with the original author for Hoogeveen et al (2018), in which we failed to replicate the original findings. However, we are also aware of post-hoc disputes about replication outcomes, for instance in relation to the ManyLabs Note.…”