Expectations, Assumptions and Realities: Scottish Local Government Post-Devolution

Abstract

This article reviews developments in Scottish local government post-devolution. In doing so it outlines some expectations, assumptions and realities about local government in Scotland. Three assumptions are examined and rejected: 1999 was 'Year Zero' for Scottish local government; central-local relations are characterised by a cohesive centre versus a cohesive locality; central-local relations in Scotland are nothing more than a fuzzy microcosm of central-local relations in England. The article argues that Scotland increasingly offers a different 'story' of central-local government relations with pre-existing differences accentuating in the context of minority government, different processes of governance and attitudes to the welfare state.This article seeks to highlight inaccurate assumptions about Scottish local government post-devolution. It is suggested that these have arisen due to a combination of expectations, ignorance, misrepresentation and misunderstanding of pre-and postdevolution developments in Scotland. These assumptions lead to implications not only for political actors in Scotland and the UK but also for the wider research agenda. The analysis in this article highlights that Scottish local government was on a trajectory of difference and separation before 1999. Devolution has merely magnified preexisting differences (McGarvey and Cairney 2008, 8). The research for this article has been informed by a thorough review of key texts and journal articles in the field of both Scottish politics and local government in the UK over the past 30 years.A neglect of the prehistory of devolution tends to exaggerate its impact and a unitary conception of the UK state, whereas acknowledgement of the significant legacy of existing governance processes tempers such analysis. It is often neglected that part of the rationale of devolution in Scotland was based on a conservative impulse to protect welfare state institutions in Scotland from the reforming zeal of the UK government. In frustration at its exclusion from power (despite nine successive general election 'victories'-in terms of being the largest party-in Scotland) the Scottish Labour party post-1987 chose engagement with other parties, constitutional and electoral reform.Pre-devolution discussion of UK politics tended to characterise the UK as a unitary state-it tended to assume that Scotland was a micro version of wider UK politics. Ian McAllister and Richard Rose (1984), discussing electoral behaviour, refer to Scotland as 'British with a difference '. Arthur Midwinter et al. (1991) outline a

Faktor Penentu Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah

“…Penerapan otonomi daerah yang mem berikan kekuasaan dan wewenang kepada daerah untuk menciptakan efisiensi, efek tifitas, akuntabilitas, dan good government governance justru malah membuat masa lah baru bagi pemerintah daerah. Pelaksa naan otonomi daerah yang semakin terbuka menurut beberapa peneliti (Cordis, 2014;Colquhoun, 2013;Dolg, 2014;McGarvey, 2012;Røge & Lennon, 2018) justru mem buka ruang bagi munculnya korupsi yang semakin tinggi di daerah. Temuan ini di mungkinkan terjadi karena otonomi daerah menciptakan sistem pengawasan yang long gar atau tidak terlalu ketat terhadap peme rintah daerah yang dilakukan oleh pusat.…”

Compromise, partnership, control: Community Justice Authorities in Scotland

“…The second reason for local government resistance to the proposal was a broader concern that it would be the 'thin end of the wedge' for increased centralization in the early years of devolution (Morrison, 2012). Though centralization had begun to increase with New Labour in Westminster before devolution (McGarvey, 2012), the devolution settlement resulted in a step-change of scrutiny, regulation and accountability of local government under the first two terms of the Parliament via mechanisms such as ring-fencing and targets (McGarvey, 2002(McGarvey, , 2012. Discussion around Scottish community justice reform thus became entangled in debates about political control, as well as the nature and organization of community justice.…”

“…Discussion around Scottish community justice reform thus became entangled in debates about political control, as well as the nature and organization of community justice. Scotland is therefore a clear example of a jurisdiction whose penal policies were moderated by the presence of PR political systems (Lacey, 2008(Lacey, , 2012 and multilevel governance structures which necessitate negotiation and compromise (McGarvey, 2012).…”

“…The Concordat granted local authorities more budgetary discretion and funding, in return for freezing council tax (which the SNP manifesto had promised to scrap entirely). Local authorities also committed to perform against a set of national outcomes and performance indicators (McGarvey, 2012). Most ring-fencing of funding for local services was removed; notably, the block grant for CJSW was almost the only funding to remain ring-fenced (although reoffending was not included in the Concordat's indicators).…”

“…Although not part of the growing body of comparative community punishment scholarship (see Robinson and McNeill, 2016), this article shares with some comparative research a concern with how the development and organization of penal institutions reflect changing nation-state identities and state-building efforts. Particularly important is the influence of central/local structures in the post-devolutionary landscape (Jeffery, 2006;McGarvey, 2002McGarvey, , 2012. We also draw on Lacey's (2008Lacey's ( , 2012 argument about the role played by political (especially electoral) configurations in shaping the style of penal policy making.…”