Excuses for Hume's Skepticism

Avnur, Yuval

doi:10.1111/phpr.12197

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…7) and Wilson (1997). It is in my view most promisingly defended in Avnur (2016). A similar view is endorsed in Campbell (2009), which maintains that Hume endorses submission to one's psychological inclinations.…”

Section: Hume's Epistemology In the Treatisementioning

confidence: 52%

Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question

Qu¹

2019

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This article surveys the state of the literature on Hume’s epistemology, focusing on treatments of what has come to be known as the “Kemp Smith problem,” that is, the problem of reconciling Hume’s skepticism with his naturalism. It first surveys the literature on this issue with regard to the Treatise, moving on to briefly compare the Treatise and the Enquiry in virtue of their epistemological frameworks, before finally examining the literature with regard to the first Enquiry.

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Section: Hume's Epistemology In the Treatisementioning

confidence: 52%

Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question

Qu¹

2019

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…11Some notable recent exceptions include Avnur (2012, 2016), Boult (2017), Williamson (Forthcoming), Littlejohn (Forthcoming), Schechter (2017), and Madison (2018). …”

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confidence: 99%

Justifications and excuses in epistemology

Greco

2019

Nous

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While epistemologists have long debated what it takes for beliefs to be justified, they've devoted much less collective attention to the question of what it takes for beliefs to be excused, and how excuses differ from justifications. This stands in contrast to the state of affairs in legal scholarship, where the contrast between justifications and excuses is a standard topic in introductory criminal law textbooks. My goal in this paper is to extract some lessons from legal theory for epistemologists seeking to distinguish epistemic justifications from epistemic excuses. First, I'll provide a brief overview of appeals to the justification/excuse distinction in epistemology, focusing on the internalism/externalism debate. Then, I'll identify some choice points in legal theory for how to think about the function of the justification/excuse distinction, and will in turn correspond to analogous choice points in epistemology. Ultimately, I'll argue that depending on which way we go at some crucial junctures, we can motivate either a traditional, non‐factive, internalist conception of justification, or a purely factive one where truth is all that's required for a belief to be justified. But there's no clear path, via legal theory, to view that only beliefs that amount to knowledge are justified.

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“… See Avnur () for another example of a commentator that does not take the pragmatic justification expressed in this passage to exhaust Hume's response to scepticism. …”

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Hume's Internalist Epistemology inEHU 12

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Much has been written about Kemp Smith's (1941) famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has been unduly neglected. This paper seeks to address Kemp Smith's problem from the standpoint of Hume's treatment of scepticism in EHU 12, and finds an interesting internalist account that makes sense both of Hume's discussion in EHU 12, and his aims in the Enquiry as a whole. Moreover, it is one that is of substantive philosophical interest, having intriguing parallels to contemporary epistemological accounts.

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Excuses for Hume's Skepticism

Cited by 5 publications

References 32 publications

Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question

Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question

Justifications and excuses in epistemology

Hume's Internalist Epistemology inEHU 12

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