2016
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-016-9254-z
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Examining the role of region and elections on representation in the UN Security Council

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Cited by 10 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Data on government ideology come from the database of political institutions (Scartascini et al, 2017). Second, executive heads may be more likely selected if their home country aligns with many other member states in international politics (Lai and Lefler, 2017). Having an executive head from a country that has similar preferences in international politics is likely preferable in order to achieve one’s goals at a given IO.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Data on government ideology come from the database of political institutions (Scartascini et al, 2017). Second, executive heads may be more likely selected if their home country aligns with many other member states in international politics (Lai and Lefler, 2017). Having an executive head from a country that has similar preferences in international politics is likely preferable in order to achieve one’s goals at a given IO.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2016) are clear that Executive Directors are not representatives in a substantive sense, but that they merely ‘stand for’ the groups that elected them. Similarly, analysing voting behaviour of regional group representatives in the SC, Lai and Lefler (2017) find that although regions do exhibit preference similarities, elected non-permanent members do not necessarily vote in line with preferences of their regions. Instead, they are more likely to vote in line with states of similar economic status.…”
Section: Representing States: Regional Representationmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Since adopting the agenda required seven affirmative votes without a right to veto for permanent members, controlling the majority of rotating members turned a significant tool for any great power in setting the agenda of the Council. Therefore, major powers had important motivation in screening and promoting candidates from regions that are likely to support their positions in the Council (Lai & Lefler, 2017). Finally, each vote has a power to increase or decrease the legitimacy of the draft resolution in question.…”
Section: Why Elected Members Mat Ter and How Gre At Powers Get Themmentioning
confidence: 99%