Mediating power? Delegation, pooling and leadership selection at international organisations

Abstract

The selection of the executive heads of international organisations represents a key decision in the politics of international organisations. However, we know little about what dynamics influence this selection. The article focuses on the nationality of selected executive heads. It argues that institutional design impacts the factors that influence leadership selection by shaping the costs and benefits of attaining the position for member states’ nationals. The argument is tested with novel data on the nationality of individuals in charge of 69 international organization bureaucracies between 1970 and 2017. Two findings stand out: first, powerful countries are more able to secure positions in international organisations in which executive heads are voted in by majority voting. Second, less consistent evidence implies that powerful countries secure more positions when bureaucracies are authoritative. The findings have implications for debates on international cooperation by illustrating how power and institutions interact in the selection of international organisation executive heads.

Divided loyalties? The role of national IO staff in aid‐funded procurement

“…They have varying policy preferences, which can color their work (Chwieroth, 2015; Ege, 2020). One source of these policy preferences can be loyalty to their home country (Heinzel, 2021; Novosad & Werker, 2019). IO staff internalize the preferences of their home country or national governments can lobby them to fulfill its interests (Dijkstra, 2017; Kleine, 2013; McKeown, 2009; Urpelainen, 2012).…”