2016
DOI: 10.1088/1751-8113/50/1/015101
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Evolutionary game theory and criticality

Abstract: We study a regular two-dimensional network of individuals playing the Prisonner’s Dilemma game with their neighbors, assigning to each individual the adoption of two different criteria to make a choice between cooperation and defection. For a fraction q  <  1 of her time the individual makes her choice by imitating those done by the nearest neighbors, with no payoff consideration. For a fraction the choice between cooperation and defection of an individual depends on the payoff difference between the most suc… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Using the terms adopted by (Rand, 2016) we may identify his intuitive decision making with the choice of imitation strength and his deliberative decision making as a direct adoption of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. The theoretical prediction made by Rand that “deliberation will undermine pure cooperation” seems to fit the observation (Mahmoodi and Grigolini, 2017) that the lack of criticality disrupts the Nowak and May network reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992). …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 60%
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“…Using the terms adopted by (Rand, 2016) we may identify his intuitive decision making with the choice of imitation strength and his deliberative decision making as a direct adoption of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. The theoretical prediction made by Rand that “deliberation will undermine pure cooperation” seems to fit the observation (Mahmoodi and Grigolini, 2017) that the lack of criticality disrupts the Nowak and May network reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992). …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 60%
“…The critical value of the control parameter K is K C = 1 in the all-to-all coupling case and K C = 1.5 (M = 100) in the case of a regular two-dimensional lattice (Mahmoodi and Grigolini, 2017). …”
Section: Decision Making Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Since the clusters of cooperators are richer than the clusters of defectors it is plausible that the most successful nearest neighbor is a cooperator. However, this attempt at mimicking the action of a collective intelligence failed because the social activity of the units, being subcritical, disrupts the beneficial effects of network reciprocity [44,45]. We note that SOTC modeling represents an attempt to amend the field of EGT by the limitations preventing, for instance, the concept of network reciprocity from yielding a satisfactory resolution of the altruism paradox.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, in modelling the decision-making process of human groups one has to take into account the effect of social interactions, which promote consensus-seeking, but also the influence of the level of expertise/knowledge of individuals. Under this perspective a few models of decision-making can be found in the literature, attempting to capture the influence of the main drivers of the individual behavior in groups, and in particular, of self-interest and consensus-seeking [47][48][49][50][51]. Following this line of research, in this paper, we employ a model of decision making, already proposed by GC and IG in [51], where consensus-seeking is modelled using the Ising-Glauber dynamics [52,53], whereas the knowledge of each member in the group is modelled through an individual fitness landscape described in terms of a Kauffman N K model [54,55].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%