Evolutionary game analysis on the effective co-opetition mechanism of partners within high quality pork supply chain

Sun, Shuhan; Zhang, Jianru; Lin, Hai

doi:10.1109/soli.2008.4682873

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…All these studies ignored the penalty imposed by the other side when one player of the supply chain chooses not to cooperate (speculation). In view of this, Sun et al (2008) studied the quality and safety control behavior of each population in the pork supply chain by constructing an evolutionary game model. The model took into consideration the punishment of the speculators, but their research ignored the risk of the non‐cooperative (speculative) behavior of both parties, so there is still a gap with the actual situation.…”

Section: Summary Of Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auto parts quality certification and manufacturer regulation: An evolutionary game theory perspective

Cai,

Li,

Wang

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper explores a two‐population evolutionary game that models the role of manufacturer regulation as a motivation to auto parts quality certification. In particular, we assume that auto parts suppliers can choose whether or not to obtain the certification, ensuring a relatively high quality of the products, and manufactures can choose whether or not to engage in regulation for certification facilitation, influencing the suppliers' incentive to avoid punishment of uncertificated products. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and conduct static and dynamic evolutionary analyses. The research shows that reducing the auto parts suppliers' certification cost, increasing the penalty cost of the supplier who provides the auto parts that are not certified, and distributing the risk‐loss proportion of manufacturer and supplier properly can encourage auto parts suppliers to obtain the quality certification.

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Section: Summary Of Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auto parts quality certification and manufacturer regulation: An evolutionary game theory perspective

Cai,

Li,

Wang

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Sun et al utilized dual-population evolutionary game theory to investigate the evolutionary process and influencing factors of the cooperation mechanism in the pork supply chain and devise a series of measures to promote effective competition and cooperation within the high-quality pork supply chain. These measures include reducing cooperation costs, increasing cooperation income, and establishing a fair and efficient system for income distribution and risk compensation [42]. Through the analysis of an evolutionary game model, Lin et al discovered that the benefits of digital technology empowerment, spillover effects, and supervisory effects exhibit positive correlations with governments, platform centers, and node enterprises' willingness to undergo e-commerce transformation [43].…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Models and Their Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategies selection for building e-commerce platforms for agricultural wholesale markets: A tripartite evolutionary game perspective

Luo,

Wang,

Liu

2024

PLoS ONE

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The rapid advancement and widespread implementation of digital technology have created opportunities for the e-commerce transformation of agricultural wholesale markets. The building of e-commerce platforms in this process is of utmost importance and should be approached methodically. This article analyzes the interests and behavioral choices of the agricultural wholesale markets, local government, and wholesalers by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model. It applies replicator dynamics equations to describe the evolutionary strategies of each party. The findings of the study indicate that the behavioral choices of agricultural wholesale markets, local government, and wholesalers are influenced by their initial intentions. Furthermore, there exists a degree of alignment between the choices made by agricultural wholesale markets and wholesalers. The building of e-commerce platforms by agricultural wholesale markets can be facilitated through direct and indirect government subsidies; this also motivates wholesalers to adopt and utilize these platforms. Agricultural wholesale markets may further incentivize wholesalers to utilize their own e-commerce platforms by offering additional benefits. On the other hand, if the agricultural wholesale markets demonstrate strong initial inclinations toward using third-party e-commerce platforms. In this scenario, the local government has the potential to promote the widespread use of these platforms by providing both direct and indirect financial incentives to these markets, as well as actively encouraging wholesalers to participate in them. This study presents policy recommendations for agricultural wholesale markets and local government to support the effective implementation of e-commerce platforms in the agricultural wholesaler markets and facilitate a smooth transition to e-commerce in agricultural wholesale markets.

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“…The basic idea of evolutionary game is that seeking systematic Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and ESS is the selected behavior strategy here [19] .…”

Section: The Co-opetition Evolutionary Game Of Hitech Enterprise Innomentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis on the co-opetition of enterprise innovation in hi-tech industry cluster

Tong

2013

2013 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering 20th Annual Conference Proceedings

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The paper established cournot duopoly competition model with price's co-opetition, introduced degree of willingness to cooperate, and analyzed the impact of price's co-opetition on the degree of willingness to cooperate. the overall profit and individual differences are compared under two cases which are both partial cooperation, one partial cooperation and the other betrayal, revealing the characteristics of decision-making behavior. as co excess profits do not represent the individual's excess profits, betrayal is the optimal choice. reasonably efficient profits allocation mechanisms and contractual constraints, are the condition of oligopolistic stable cooperation.

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Evolutionary game analysis on the effective co-opetition mechanism of partners within high quality pork supply chain

Cited by 8 publications

References 2 publications

Auto parts quality certification and manufacturer regulation: An evolutionary game theory perspective

Auto parts quality certification and manufacturer regulation: An evolutionary game theory perspective

Strategies selection for building e-commerce platforms for agricultural wholesale markets: A tripartite evolutionary game perspective

Evolutionary game analysis on the co-opetition of enterprise innovation in hi-tech industry cluster

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