Event Logs Generated by an Operating System Running on a COTS Computer During IEMI Exposure

Kasmi, Chaouki; Lopes-Esteves, José; Picard, Nicolas; Renard, Mathieu; Beillard, Bruno; Martinod, Edson; Andrieu, Joël; Lalande, Michèle

doi:10.1109/temc.2014.2357060

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Methods for detecting irradiated EM waves have also been reported. A method of detection by measuring the power supply voltage on the FPGA that fluctuates owing to the irradiated EM waves [27], a method of detection by measurement of the frequency and phase synchronization gap between the reference CLK and the FPGA's CLK [28], a method of detection by analysis of the abnormal operation log of the system caused by interference with transmission signals [29], and a method of detection by measurement using hardware consisting of SDRs and/or discrete components [30], [31]. These methods can detect the irradiated EM wave, which is the first stage of Echo TEM-PEST, and interrupt the transmission process of the information, making it more difficult for an attacker to obtain the Echo.…”

Section: A Methods That Make It Difficult To Obtain the Echomentioning

confidence: 99%

Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices

Kaji

Fujimoto

Kinugawa

et al. 2023

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Electromagnetic (EM) information leakage encourages attacks, wherein the attackers passively capture and analyze EM waves that are unintentionally generated by devices. Generally, devices with weak EM emission intensities are not targeted. However, even these devices would be subject to attacks if it becomes possible to actively sense the electrical changes that occur within them when information is processed. This article demonstrates the feasibility of the information leakage threat induced by the active sensing of input impedance changes in the input/output (I/O) circuit of an integrated circuit (IC). Specifically, the changes in the input impedance when information was transmitted from the IC, were measured by irradiating the EM waves from outside the target device. This article labels the threat as Echo TEMPEST. The experiment validated Echo TEMPEST with an evaluation board that simulated the I/O circuit of the IC, UART modules, and USB keyboards. It was also demonstrated that attackers could control the distance (obtained information from the target device), depending on the intensity of the irradiated EM waves. Furthermore, we discussed countermeasure methods focusing on the conditions for executing Echo TEMPEST.

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Section: A Methods That Make It Difficult To Obtain the Echomentioning

confidence: 99%

Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices

Kaji

Fujimoto

Kinugawa

et al. 2023

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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“…With hardwired IEMI, attack will be stronger, but more access to the home is needed. IEMI can either produce a disruption which may require manual restart, corrupt data, or even permanently damage electronic equipment [12], [13], [14], and [15]. It can be easily perceived that any of these outcomes could pose a serious risk to the devices inside a smart home.…”

Section: History Of Imei and Its Potential Impact On Smart Homesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Susceptibility of a Smart Home to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference Attacks

Davlyatov¹,

Mahfouz²,

Jones³

et al. 2015

NN-EEE

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Technology advancements are shaping the construction industry gradually. Smart homes have become a reality and insome cases a trend due to these advancements. Although the literature includes multitude of efforts addressing the technologies used in smart homes, integration processes, and privacy issues, little exists about their vulnerability to Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference (IEMI). In an attempt to address this gap, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the proliferation of smart home technologies, their susceptibility to IEMI attacks, currently available mechanisms of defense, and to provide a cost assessment model of the most suited protection approaches to be adopted by the construction industry. To that end, the adopted research methodology collected and analyzed a set of relevant peer reviewed publication within the domain, and developed different construction cost estimates utilizing standard reference books, like RSMeans, and direct contact with system suppliers. The outcomes of the aforementioned methodology yielded two potential protection methods, namely full protection of the home shell; and partial protection for essential components while providing a detection system of potential attacks. The average achieved costs per square foot range from $7.91 to $20.11 depending on the selection of material and type of finish. It is instigated that the outcomes of this research provide a much needed knowledge about the propensity of smart homes to IMEI attacks and provide a guidance cost estimate for protection mechanism. It also provides a better understanding for home owners regarding their decisions.

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“…Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and electromagnetic interference (EMI) threats have been studied by EMC experts in order to enhance the survivability of electronic devices and communication networks exposed to intentional electromagnetic interferences (IEMI) [1]- [4]. In addition, information security scientists have shown a high interest in fault injection on crypto systems [5]- [6] for secret keys extractions using EM pulses.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both communities have in common their need for characterizing the effects of EM perturbations at the system level. Recently, a fine-grain classification of the effects of IEMI has been proposed [4] in which it was shown that the emitted signal envelop was induced and could be recorded on a sound card without connecting a microphone. Complementary experiments [7] have confirmed the high susceptibility of sound cards, Manuscript [2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

IEMI Threats for Information Security: Remote Command Injection on Modern Smartphones

Kasmi

Esteves

2015

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Numerous papers dealing with the analysis of electromagnetic attacks against critical electronic devices have been made publicly available. In this paper, we exploit the principle of front-door coupling on smartphones headphone cables with specific electromagnetic waveforms. We present a smart use of intentional electromagnetic interference, resulting in finer impacts on an information system than a classical denial of service effect. As an outcome, we introduce a new silent remote voice command injection technique on modern smartphones.Index Terms-Electronic warfare, information security, intentional electromagnetic interference.

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Event Logs Generated by an Operating System Running on a COTS Computer During IEMI Exposure

Cited by 7 publications

References 8 publications

Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices

Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices

Susceptibility of a Smart Home to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference Attacks

IEMI Threats for Information Security: Remote Command Injection on Modern Smartphones

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