2015
DOI: 10.1109/temc.2015.2463089
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IEMI Threats for Information Security: Remote Command Injection on Modern Smartphones

Abstract: Numerous papers dealing with the analysis of electromagnetic attacks against critical electronic devices have been made publicly available. In this paper, we exploit the principle of front-door coupling on smartphones headphone cables with specific electromagnetic waveforms. We present a smart use of intentional electromagnetic interference, resulting in finer impacts on an information system than a classical denial of service effect. As an outcome, we introduce a new silent remote voice command injection tech… Show more

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Cited by 78 publications
(70 citation statements)
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References 8 publications
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“…This is because headphones can be used as FM antennas and can thus not be effectively shielded. It should be noted that the field strength required was in the order of 25−30 V m −1 , which is close to the limit for human safety, and an order of magnitude higher than the required immunity level (3 V m −1 ) [38]. This illustrates that high powers might still be required for reasonable attack distances: in a subsequent work, the authors noted that their attack requires a power of 40 W for a distance of 2 m, and 200 W for a distance of 4 m [40].…”
Section: Electromagnetic Transmissionsmentioning
confidence: 75%
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“…This is because headphones can be used as FM antennas and can thus not be effectively shielded. It should be noted that the field strength required was in the order of 25−30 V m −1 , which is close to the limit for human safety, and an order of magnitude higher than the required immunity level (3 V m −1 ) [38]. This illustrates that high powers might still be required for reasonable attack distances: in a subsequent work, the authors noted that their attack requires a power of 40 W for a distance of 2 m, and 200 W for a distance of 4 m [40].…”
Section: Electromagnetic Transmissionsmentioning
confidence: 75%
“…The term (sensor) spoofing [8], [9], [14], [43] was also Injection [5], [13], [35], [38], [41]- [44] Intentional Interference [5], [10], [12], [36], [38], [40], [42], [49] Non-Linearity [11], [54], [55], [68] Spoofing [8], [9], [14], [43] Other (See Text) [7], [53], [67] avoided for similar reasons: it has an overloaded meaning in authentication contexts and with in-band signal injection attacks [6], [52]. Moreover, it does not capture the physical aspect of injections, and does not accurately describe coarsegrained attacks which lead to saturation of a sensor.…”
Section: Choice Of Terminologymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The google speech recognition library is very handful in this prospect. Kasmi and Esteves [9] considered the problem of coverting audio commands. The work in [10] proposes a Magical Mirror as an interface to provide basic services.…”
Section: Background Of Studymentioning
confidence: 99%