In recent years, there has been increased interest in the terahertz waveband for application to ultra-high-speed wireless communications and remote sensing systems. However, atmospheric propagation at these wavelengths has a significant effect on the operational stability of systems using the terahertz waveband, so elucidating the effects of rain on propagation is a topic of high interest. We demonstrate various methods for calculating attenuation due to rain and evaluate these methods through comparison with calculated and experimental values. We find that in the 90 -225 GHz microwave band, values calculated according to Mie scattering theory using the Best and P-S sleet raindrop size distributions best agree with experimental values. At 313 and 355 GHz terahertz-waveband frequencies, values calculated according to Mie scattering theory using the Weibull distribution and a prediction model following ITU-R recommendations best agree with experimental values. We furthermore find that attenuation due to rain increases in proportion to frequency for microwave-band frequencies below approximately 50 GHz, but that there is a peak at around 100 GHz, above which the degree of attenuation remains steady or decreases. Rain-induced attenuation increases in proportion to the rainfall intensity.

Electromagnetic-fault injection (EM-FI) setups are appealing since they can be made at a low cost, achieve relatively high spatial resolutions, and avoid the need of tampering with the PCB or packaging of the target. In this paper we first sketch the importance of understanding the pulse characteristics of a pulse injection setup in order to successfully mount an attack. We then look into the different components that make up an EM-pulse setup and demonstrate their impact on the pulse shape. The different components are then assembled to form an EM-pulse injection setup. The effectiveness of the setup and how different design decisions impact the outcome of a fault injection campaign are demonstrated on a 32-bit ARM microcontroller.

We investigate the effects of EM pulses on an ATmega328p 8-bit microcontroller. We establish which areas of the chip are sensitive to EM pulse injection and describe the fault model for these sensitive areas. Furthermore, we compare our results to those of a previous study, which examined the effects of laser fault injection on the same device.

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The problem of information leakage through electromagnetic waves for various devices has been extensively discussed in literature. Conventionally, devices that are under such a threat suffer from potential electromagnetic information leakage during their operation. Further, the information inside the devices can be obtained by monitoring the electromagnetic waves leaking at the boundaries of the devices. The leakage of electromagnetic waves, however, was not observed for some devices, and such devices were not the target of the threat discussed above. In light of this circumstance, this paper discusses an “interceptor” that forces the leakage of information through electromagnetic waves, even from devices in which potential electromagnetic leakage does not occur. The proposed interceptor is a small circuit consisting of an affordable semiconductor chip and wiring and is powered by electromagnetic waves that irradiate from the outside of a device as its driving energy. The distance at which information is obtained is controlled by increasing the intensity of the irradiated electromagnetic waves. The paper presents the structure of the circuit for implementing the proposed interceptor to be used in major input–output devices and cryptographic modules, mounting a pathway designed on the basis of the construction method onto each device. Moreover, it is shown that it is possible to forcefully cause information leakage through electromagnetic waves. To detect the aforementioned threat, the paper also focuses on the changes in a device itself and the surrounding electromagnetic environment as a result of mounting an interceptor and considers a method of detecting an interceptor by both passive and active monitoring methods.

Electromagnetic (EM) information leakage encourages attacks, wherein the attackers passively capture and analyze EM waves that are unintentionally generated by devices. Generally, devices with weak EM emission intensities are not targeted. However, even these devices would be subject to attacks if it becomes possible to actively sense the electrical changes that occur within them when information is processed. This article demonstrates the feasibility of the information leakage threat induced by the active sensing of input impedance changes in the input/output (I/O) circuit of an integrated circuit (IC). Specifically, the changes in the input impedance when information was transmitted from the IC, were measured by irradiating the EM waves from outside the target device. This article labels the threat as Echo TEMPEST. The experiment validated Echo TEMPEST with an evaluation board that simulated the I/O circuit of the IC, UART modules, and USB keyboards. It was also demonstrated that attackers could control the distance (obtained information from the target device), depending on the intensity of the irradiated EM waves. Furthermore, we discussed countermeasure methods focusing on the conditions for executing Echo TEMPEST.

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