Evaluating and Regulating the Impacts of Lobbying in the<scp>EU</scp>? The Case Study of Green Industries

Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

doi:10.1002/eet.567

Cited by 17 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 15 publications

(14 reference statements)

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“…This question has not been dealt with adequately in the literature, first and foremost because corruption is difficult to measure due to lack of regulation and transparency (Europa 2011). This is in stark contrast to the US experience, with its comprehensive and transparent legislation on corruption (Svendsen 2011).…”

mentioning

confidence: 64%

“…In the case of legal rent-seeking, lobbyists can meet and try to influence political decision makers, e.g., informing decision makers about the consequences of smoking tobacco or liberalizing the agricultural sector in the EU. In addition to professional meetings, legal lobbying activities may include reports or publicity campaigns (Kurrild-Klitgaard 1998;Svendsen 2011).…”

Section: Bureaucratic Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

Brandt

Svendsen

2013

Public Choice

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Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission's anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principalsupervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is larger than the expected value to the principal of truth-telling by the supervisor. Overall, this analysis points to the risks of flawed incentives and the lack of institutional independence among principal, agent, supervisor and client. Our main policy recommendations as a result of these findings are that OLAF should be placed outside the Commission, and that whistleblowers should receive adequate protection.

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confidence: 64%

Section: Bureaucratic Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

Brandt

Svendsen

2013

Public Choice

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“…This is a strong indication that the Chinese government wishes to promote Chinese industrial interests, at the same time protecting the public health. Also, wind turbine producers tend to be well-organized due to small-group advantages and one clear and common goal, namely to increase the megawatt production based on wind turbines (Svendsen, 2011).…”

Section: Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sinking into the Sea? Climate Change and AOSIS Strategies

Højland¹,

Svendsen²

2017

JAS

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Climate change poses a serious threat to the world, in particular to the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The organisation Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) represents the SIDS by giving them a voice in the United Nations. We discuss the different aspects of climate change and the role that a small actor like AOSIS plays in protecting the citizens of its member states rather than free ride on larger actors. Which strategies should AOSIS use to encourage an even more ambitious climate policy in the future? We suggest five relevant strategies: 1) Introduction of sanctions in the Paris Agreement, 2) A CO 2 tax, 3) Subsidising new green technology, 4) That AOSIS should look for coalition partners, e.g. China, and 5) Even stronger focus on the linkage between climate change and future migration. Employing such strategies may save the SIDS from sinking into the sea and, at the same time, secure the target level from the Paris Agreement.

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“…Although lobbying effectiveness is very difficult to measure due to its concealed nature in the process of decision-making (Lowery, 2002;Svendsen, 2011) and the great variety of ways the lobbying takes place (Lowery et al, 2008;Van Schendelen, 2012), it has empirically been shown that it does have an effect on the outcome of a lobbied concept (e.g. Baron & Hirsch, 2012;Gawande, Krishna, & Robbins, 2006;Gawande, Maloney, & Montes-Rojas, 2009;Husted, 1991;Kee, Olarreaga, & Silva, 2007;Panke, 2012;Vining et al, 2005).…”

Section: Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Baron & Hirsch, 2012;Gawande, Krishna, & Robbins, 2006;Gawande, Maloney, & Montes-Rojas, 2009;Husted, 1991;Kee, Olarreaga, & Silva, 2007;Panke, 2012;Vining et al, 2005). Lobbying plays an important role as it can shape the decisions that are taken, make sure that a status quo prevails and influence the attitudes of decision-makers by moulding the political agenda (Baron & Hirsch, 2012;Gawande et al, 2009;Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998;Svendsen, 2011). The pursuit of economic benefits is usually the reason for lobbying (Crosby & Orsini, 1996;Mack, 2005).…”

Section: Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chapter 9 Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats: Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor

Bondarouk¹,

Ruel²

2012

Commercial Diplomacy and International Business: A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration

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Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by Advanced Series in ManagementFor Authors: If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service. Information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comWith over forty years' experience, Emerald Group Publishing is a leading independent publisher of global research with impact in business, society, public policy and education. In total, Emerald publishes over 275 journals and more than 130 book series, as well as an extensive range of online products and services. Emerald is both COUNTER 3 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.*Related content and download information correct at time of download. Chapter 9Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats: Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor Elena Bondarouk and Huub Rue¨l AbstractThe aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of how commercial diplomats lobby for public procurement contracts. The institutional environment has ramifications for the manner of lobbying and for the practice of commercial diplomacy. This research brings together these streams of literature, and a conceptual model is developed. By means of an in-depth, single-case study, investigating the lobbying activities of EU diplomats in Indonesia, the study aimed to illustrate the model and draw the list of lobbying activities applicable for commercial diplomats. The findings reveal that in a weak institutional development environment, the diplomats focus on informational lobbying and rely heavily on their networks. If the decision-making powers are decentralized, the diplomats target more decisionmakers. If diplomats do not have an access to decision-makers then 'voice' lobbying is applied. If the decision-makers are not elected, the diplomats do not engage in constituency-building lobbying. The findings illustrate the plausibility of the introduced conceptual model. They also suggest that domestic factors, such as interest in the host country, priority status of the host country and historical bilateral ties can positively influence the lobbying activities of the diplomats as well.

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Evaluating and Regulating the Impacts of Lobbying in theEU? The Case Study of Green Industries

Cited by 17 publications

References 15 publications

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

Sinking into the Sea? Climate Change and AOSIS Strategies

Chapter 9 Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats: Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor

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