Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Unilateral actions the case of international environmental problems Urs Steiner Brandt April 2003All rights reserved. No part of this WORKING PAPER may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the written permission of IME except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. AbstractWhen abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes privately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries' reactions, and it might suffer from an effect like the winners curse.JEL Classification: Q28, H4, D8

Response to caloric stimulation was examined in two subjects in the weightless environment of orbital flight. Using air insufflation, a binaural temperature stimulus profile was performed twice on each subject during flight. In all but one test, which was carried out on the first mission day, a caloric nystagmus was registered. This zero-g nystagmus was similar to ground-based pre- and postflight responses with regard to its intensity, its temporal correlation with the stimulus profile (nystagmus was always directed towards the warmer ear) and the subjective sensations reported by the tested subjects. These findings demonstrate that mechanisms other than thermoconvection are involved in the elicitation of the caloric nystagmus response. At each stage of the temperature stimulus profile, linear acceleratory stimulation was presented in the form of oscillations in the X-axis. Some differences were found between one-g and zero-g conditions in the resultant modification of the nystagmus response.

Is local participation always optimal for sustainable action? Here, Local Agenda 21 is a relevant case as it broadly calls for consensus-building among stakeholders. Consensus-building is, however, costly. We show that the costs of making local decisions are likely to rapidly exceed the benefits. Why? Because as the number of participants grows, the more likely it is that the group will include individuals who have an extreme position and are unwilling to make compromises. Thus, the net gain of self-organization should be compared with those of its alternatives, for example voting, market-solutions, or not making any choices at all. Even though the informational value of meetings may be helpful to policy makers, the model shows that it also decreases as the number of participants increase. Overall, the result is a thought provoking scenario for Local Agenda 21 as it highlights the risk of less sustainable action in the future.

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To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in Rent-seeking and grandfathering:The case of GHG trade in the EU Urs Steiner Brandt Gert Tinggaard Svendsen September 2002All rights reserved. No part of this WORKING PAPER may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the written permission of IME except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. SummaryThe EU Commission has recently proposed a new directive establishing a framework for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading within the European Union. The idea is to devalue the emission quotas in circulation by the year 2012 at latest, so that the EU will meet its Kyoto target level of an 8% GHG reduction. Our main question is whether the final choice of allocation rule can be explained by potential industrial net winners involved in the policy making process. We answer this question by using rent-seeking theory and by analysing the Green Paper hearing replies from the main industrial groups. In other words, we want to explain and observe how rent-seeking (or lobbyism) affects the design of environmental regulation and energy policy in favour of well-organized industrial interest groups. We argue that some firms are likely to reap a net gain from being regulated by a grandfathered emission trading system. This is so because total costs of emission reduction and lobbyism are likely to be smaller than the total rents from having this type of regulation.JEL Classification: Q28, H2, H4

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission's anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principalsupervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is larger than the expected value to the principal of truth-telling by the supervisor. Overall, this analysis points to the risks of flawed incentives and the lack of institutional independence among principal, agent, supervisor and client. Our main policy recommendations as a result of these findings are that OLAF should be placed outside the Commission, and that whistleblowers should receive adequate protection.