Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

Abstract

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission's anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principalsupervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is larger than the expected value to the principal of truth-telling by the supervisor. Overall, this analysis points to the risks of flawed incentives and the lack of institutional independence among principal, agent, supervisor and client. Our main policy recommendations as a result of these findings are that OLAF should be placed outside the Commission, and that whistleblowers should receive adequate protection.

Tackling practical issues in fraud control: a practice-based study

“…Political interests, either micro or macro political interests, in corrupt organisations brings behavioural change within an organisation. For instance, Brandt and Svendsen (2013) explore why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU? They argue, the dynamics of bureaucratic corruption in the EU are caused by a well linked individuals between an organisation structure and external power.…”

Psychological factors: self- and circumstances-caused fraud triggers

“…The study shows that "bargaining" or "lobbying" is a common approach for state and local politicians to manage their goals, especially if there is event related to government failures. Even though "bargaining" or "lobbying" does not always produce negative consequences, it according to empirical study carried out by Brandt and Svendsen (2013) becomes illegal mechanism, obstructing as well as promoting change that prosper impermissible behaviours. Brandt and Svendsen (2013), who study bureaucratic corruption occurring in the EU system, conclude that bureaucratic corruption in EU is likely to occur if people in power accept something of negotiable value as an exchange for hiding the truth.…”

El juez constitucional y la reelección presidencial en América Latina

“…El propósito de este artículo es determinar si la reelección presidencial y el juez constitucional, de manera conjunta, fortalecen la rendición de cuentas en los países de América Latina. En la medida que el proceso electoral implica delegación de funciones entre la ciudadanía y sus representantes, relación determinada por la presencia de problemas de información, la perspectiva teórica del modelo principal-agente resulta pertinente para abordar el problema planteado (Laffont, 2000;Laffont y Martirmort, 2002;Besley, 2006;Brandt y Svendsen, 2013). Como lo exponen, entre otros, Pérez (2007) y Gailmard (2012), esta teoría es un marco natural para estudiar la rendición de cuentas en las instituciones políticas, toda vez que provee un marco teórico flexible para modelar innumerables variaciones en los arreglos institucionales y comparar su potencial para inducir resultados deseables en el comportamiento de los agentes.…”