Epistemological barriers to radical behaviorism

Abstract

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.

The structure of the cognitive revolution: An examination from the philosophy of science

“…It is more difficult to determine what exactly was responsible for this persuasiveness. We hypothesize that it was a combination of (a) the higher persuasive burden of the behavioral research tradition (O'Donohue, Callaghan, & Ruckstuhl, 1998) and (b) the persuasiveness of writings of key cognitive researchers and theorists (e.g., Chomsky).…”

A tale of three blind men on the proper subject matter of clinical science and practice: Commentary on Plaud's behaviorism vs. Ilardi and Feldman's cognitive neuroscience

“…A science of private life is what makes radical behaviorism radical and is what differentiates behavior analysis from Watsonian and other forms of neo-behaviorism. Our point here is that such scientific talk about behavior is quite foreign and, in many respects, represents one of several barriers to a more widespread acceptance of behavior analysis (O'Donohue et al, 1998).…”

“…Behavior analysis is, in many respects, a difficult path to follow, in part because the behavior analytic worldview (i.e., contextualism)-including related scientific terms and principles-run counter to common nonscientific forms of talking, both with respect to our own actions and explanations offered for the actions of others (see Hawkins & Forsyth, 1997;Jacobson, 1997;O'Donohue, Callaghan, & Ruckstuhl, 1998). For instance, every day we hear ourselves and others speak of feeling tired, stressed, angry, remorseful, hurt, anxious, afraid, joyful, and such terms quite often are offered as explanations for what we and others do.…”

Is it Heuristics in Use or ‘Ritualistic and Instrumentalist’ in Purpose? Neoliberal Philosophy and the Use of KAPS (Knowledge, Attitude and Practise Surveys) in a Least Developed Nation

“…Though, assumptions are preordained, the level of understanding and interest of the researchers often limit the selection of specific assumptions [39]. All research proceeds by 'assuming away' the incomprehensible through building a framework of inferred knowledge based on that which is recognized with a hope that what is 'assumed away' is not crucial to the research questions under study [40].…”